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I.  Introduction
The past fifty years have witnessed a growing divergence in family structure by race and
social class.  This paper attempts to understand these dramatic trends.  It argues that this
dispersion can best be explained as the product of growing differences in styles of thinking about
partner choice and reproductive behavior.  Drawing on the work of psychologists Richard
Herrnstein and Gene Heyman, the paper presents a model that contrasts two distinct types of
“rational” choice: “global” and “local.”  It then demonstrates that average disparities by race and
class in the adoption of local or global decisionmaking methods can account for the significant
demographic variations now observed in rates of marriage, divorce, and out of wedlock
childbearing.  The paper then suggests that this diversity emerged in the wake of the normative
deregulation of the sexual revolution.  The demise of strong heuristic mores and institutional
constraints, and the rise of ad hoc individualism and moral improvisation, facilitated the
development of contrasting decisionmaking styles in intimate relations. 
II.  The demographic dispersion in family structure
The past fifty years have seen dramatic changes in sexual behavior, patterns of
reproduction, and family life.   Fewer people are getting married, cohabitation is on the rise,
divorce is commonplace, extra-marital sex is pervasive, and out-of-wedlock childbearing has
1  See, e.g., Andrew Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-Round (2009); Stephanie Coontz, The
Way We Never Were (2000).; Amy L. Wax, “Engines of Inequality: Class, Race, and Family
Structure,” 41 Family Law Quarterly (Fall 2007); June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The
Second Revolution in Family Law (2000); Larry Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu, “Trends in
cohabitation and implications for children’s family contexts in the United States,” 54 Population
Studies (2000) 29-41.
2  Nicholas Bakalar, “Education, Faith, and a Likelihood to Wed,” New York Times
Science Times D7, March 23, 2010.  See Goldstein and Kenney, “Marriage Delayed or Marriage
Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women” 66 American Sociological
Review (2001) 506-519 (stating that “[w]omen with a college education are marrying more than
ever, but those with less education are increasingly remaining single.”). See also Adam Isen and
Betsey Stevenson, Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage, Divorce, and
Fertility (unpublished report on file with author).  
3  Adam Isen and Betsey Stevenson, Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in
Marriage, Divorce, and Fertility (unpublished report on file with author).   See also Goldstein
and Kenney, supra. 
4  Isen and Stevenson, supra.
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grown steadily for decades.1  These general developments mask important trends well known to
professional demographers: the composition of families has diverged dramatically by social
class, income, education, and race.  This segmentation is the product of three interrelated trends. 
First, although marriage rates have dropped across the board and people are marrying later, the
retreat from marriage is far more pronounced among the less privileged and some minorities,
especially blacks.   As a general matter, “[t]he higher the level of education, the more likely
people [are] to wed, and the less likely they [are] to live together.”2   Between 1950 and 2008,
according to one estimate, the percentage of 40-year old white female high school dropouts who
were married declined by 13%, while the percentage of white female married colleges graduates
increased by 16% – a reversal of historic trends.3  For white men, the percentage of married 40-
year olds declined twice as fast among high school graduates as among the college educated.4 
For blacks the retreat from marriage was more significant and affected every social class. 
During this period, rates of marriage for college educated black women under 40 decreased by
10 percent, but by 44 percent for high school dropouts; for men, the corresponding declines were
5  See R. Kelly Raley and Larry Bumpass, The Topography of the divorce plateau: Levels
and trends in union stability in the United States after 1980, 8 Demographic Research (2003)
245-160;    Steven P. Martin, “Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women's Education in the
United States,” 15 Demographic Research 537-560 (2006);  Megan M. Sweeney & Julie A.
Phillips, “Understanding Racial Differences in Marital Disruption: Recent Trends and
Explanations,” 66 Journal of Marriage and Family 639, 643 (Aug. 2004).  In summarizing
Martin’s findings, Sarah McLanahan explains that “[i]n his examination of divorce rates for
marriage cohorts of college-educated and non-college-educated women, [Steve] Martin found
that divorce rates increased for both groups (although slightly more for less-well-educated
women) from the early 1960s through the late 1970s. After 1980, however, the trends diverged,
with divorce rates falling among college-educated women and continuing to rise among less
well-educated women.”  Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies, Demography, at 612.   See also
Adam Isen and Betsey Stevenson, Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in
Marriage, Divorce, and Fertility (unpublished report on file with author)(noting declining
divorce rates for better-educated couples). See, e.g., R. Kelly Raley, and Larry Bumpass, "The
topography of the divorce plateau: Levels and trends in union stability in the United States after
1980." Demographic Research, 2003: 245 - 259. 
6  See R. Kelly Raley and Larry Bumpass, “The Topography of the divorce plateau:
Levels and trends in union stability in the United States after 1980,”  8 Demographic Research
(2003) 245-260, 256 (“We estimate that 70 percent of black women’s first marriages will end in
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20% and 55%, respectively.   Currently, only 65% of black male high school graduates are
married by age 40, and marriage rates among black high school dropouts have fallen to half their
previous rates over this period.  
Likewise, patterns of divorce have shifted decisively.   After an initial surge in divorce
across the board starting in the 1960s, recent data reveals widening disparities in the risk of
divorce by level of education, with divorce rates among college educated white women dropping
steadily since 1980, and rising among less educated whites and blacks in all social groups.5  
Although the divorce rate among whites in the early part of this decade stood at 47% overall, the
rate was 60% for high school dropouts as compared to 36% among college graduates.  Although
blacks marry less often than other major American groups, they also divorce more frequently,
with divorce rates increasing among all educational groups over the past 50 years.  About 70%
of black women’s first marriages now end in divorce, with rates remaining high across the
board.6
divorce [as compared to] 47% of white women’s.”) See also R. Kelly Raley  and Megan
Sweeney, “What Explains Race and Ethnic Variation in Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and
Nonmarital Fertility,” unpublished working paper on file with author.
7  Haskins and Sawhill, supra, at 208.  See 2007 National Vital Statistics Report, Volume
57 #12, Births: Preliminary Data.
8    Andrew Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-Round, at 167; see also  Lynn White & Stacy J.
Rogers, “Economic Circumstances and Family Outcomes: A Review of the 1990s,” 62 Journal
of Marriage and Family, 1035-1043 (Nov. 2000) (noting that the percentage of women bearing
children out of wedlock in the past fifty years has “hardly changed among the well-educated.”). 
See also Ron Haskins and Elizabeth Sawhill, Creating an Opportunity Society (2009) 203-231;
David T. Ellwood & Jonathan Crane, “Family Change Among Black Americans: What Do We
Know?,” 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 65, 68-69 (Autumn 1990); David T. Ellwood &
Christopher Jencks, “The Spread of Single Parent Families in the United States Since 1960,” in
The Future of the Family 12 (Moynihan, ed);  David T. Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, “The
Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families:  What Do We Know?  Where Do We Look for
Answers?” in  Kathryn M. Neckerman, Ed., Social Inequality 3-77 (New York:  Russell Sage
Foundation).
9  See 2007 National Vital Statistics Report, Volume 57 #12, Births: Preliminary Data.
10  See Amy Wax, Engines of Inequality, at 575
4
The drop in marriage rates has fueled a shift to single motherhood, with 40% of all births
in 2007 to unmarried women.  This figure masks significant sociodemographic disparities, with
“the least educated women . . .  six times as likely as the most educated women to have a baby
outside of marriage.”7   Those ratios are primarily the product of a rapid increase in single
motherhood among the less-privileged.  There has been little change since 1965 in the rate of
extra-marital births for women with a college degree or more, with the percentage of children
born to unmarried white college educated mothers remaining under 5%.8  The rise in single
parent families among blacks has been even more dramatic, with lower marriage rates in this
group generating an explosion in extra-marital births.  The most recent census figures reveal that
about 72% of black children are now born out of wedlock.9  Finally, family disintegration is
proceeding apace among Hispanics, with extra-marital births now standing at 45% overall, and
the trend towards single parent families accelerating faster than for other racial groups.10   
11  U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey, Sex by Marital Status by
Age for the Population 15 Years and Over.
12  Goldstein and Kenney, 66 American Sociological Review, at –.  See also Adam Isen
and Betsey Stevenson, Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage, Divorce,
and Fertility (unpublished report on file with author)
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These developments, which have been exhaustively documented by demographers and
social scientists, are confirmed by recent data gleaned from the 2006-2007 Current Population
Survey (CPS).  These are analyzed and summarized in the attached figures.11   As these show,
large differences in women’s marital and reproductive behavior persist by race and class.  White
female college graduates are significantly more likely to be married than women from less
educated groups.12  Correspondingly, the percentage of never married women among the least-
educated (those with no more than 12 years of education) is far higher than for those with a
bachelor’s degree or more.  (See figures a & b).  For white women who had children in this
period, the ratio of married to single mothers increases dramatically with more years of
education.  Although married mothers are a significant presence in every group, the contrasts are
stark:  about half of all white mothers without a high school degree are unmarried, whereas white
mothers with a college degree almost always marry before having children.  Even in this recent
cohort, almost 95% of white mothers who completed college were married at the time of their
child’s birth. (See figures c & d).
For black women, out-of wedlock childbearing is more evenly distributed by level of
education than among whites, with the ratio of single to married women higher for all levels of
education (see figures e & f), and the proportion of women giving birth outside of marriage
uniformly larger (see figures g & h).   In contrast with white women, never-married women are
in the majority regardless of level of education, with black high school graduates more likely to
be married than women with more or less schooling, and only a small percentage of high school
dropouts ever getting married.  It is not surprising, then, that giving birth outside of marriage is
the most common pattern for all black women except the most educated, with the percentage of
13  See Heather MacDonald, “Hispanic Family Values,” City Journal Autumn 2006.
14  Ibid.
15  See Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Race, Class, and Family Structure, 41 Family
Law Quarterly, at 576;  See Andrew Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-Round, at 167 (“Over the past
few decades, the family lives of the college-educated have changed much less than among
people with less education.”).  
16  See Wax, Engines of Inequality, at 577.  
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extra-marital births well over 50% for women without a college degree.  Even among black
college graduates, almost a third were unmarried, in contrast with about 7% of similarly
educated white mothers – a ratio of almost 5 to 1.  
Hispanics likewise have relatively high rates of out of wedlock childbearing, with 45% of
births to single mothers.13  Although most Hispanic mothers are currently married, over one-third
of Hispanic mothers in 2006-2007 with 12 or fewer years of schooling were single.  (See figures
I & j).  The combination of higher birth rates and lower college attendance rates for Hispanic
women has fueled a rapid increase in the rate of extra-marital births in this group.14 
The result of these developments is that well-off whites have largely maintained
traditional patterns of family, while the less privileged and minorities live in less stable
arrangements.   (See figures k and l).  Fatherless or blended families are relatively uncommon for
women who have completed four years of college or more, and the children of white college
educated parents are significantly more likely to spend their childhood living continuously with
their married biological parents.15  In contrast, only a small percentage of black children are
raised by married biological parents.16  As Jonathan Rauch has noted, marriage is now a
significant marker as well as a powerful predictor of social inequality.  “America’s families and
children may be splitting into two increasingly divergent and self-perpetuating streams – two
social classes, in other words – with marriage as the dividing line.”  Some children will “grow up
in a culture where marriage is taken for granted,” whereas others will find themselves “in a
17  Jonathan Rauch, “The Widening Marriage Gap: America’s New Class Divide,” The
National Journal (May 19, 2001).  See also Sara McLanahan, “Diverging Destinies: How
Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition” 41 Demography 607, 607
(Nov. 2004).
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culture where marriage is a pipe dream and deadbeat dads and impoverished kids are the
norm.”17  III.  Changes in Family Structure: Existing explanations and why they don’t work
Why has family composition evolved in the observed direction?   Social scientists who
have struggled to make sense of demographic developments have adopted some variant of a
rational actor model, which assumes that individuals seek to maximize their own benefit, utility,
happiness, or well-being in light of economic constraints and social circumstances.  This
approach often implicitly assumes that there is a single best, or maximizing choice for any given
set of circumstances.  Thus, regardless of group membership and cultural background, persons
will do the best they can within the constraints they face and will respond to similar conditions
by adopting predictable patterns of behavior.  It is not surprising, then, that social scientists
prefer to explain demographic changes as a “rational” response to evolving circumstances.  Since
people will not voluntarily engage in self-defeating, dysfunctional, or maladaptive behavior, the
choice to forgo marriage must be rooted in social and economic circumstances that limit choice
or that render marriage and bearing children outside of wedlock an optimal strategy.      
Along these lines, the chief explanations offered for the dispersion in reproductive
behavior look not to group differences in attitudes, outlook, or decisionmaking styles, but rather
to economic factors and broad social trends.  Economists who analyze marriage focus on money,
resources and gains from cooperation.  They predict that the primary determinants of marriage
rates will be male and female earning power and the availability of marriageable men, where that
category is defined mainly in economic terms.  Because they are more desirable mates, men with
better employment prospects and higher incomes will more often get married, whereas women
with higher earnings (who have less need of male resources) will tend to remain single.  Male
unemployment, low or declining male earnings, and high crime rates (which take men out of the
18  For a more detailed discussion, see Amy Wax, Engines of Inequality, supra, at 582-
583.  For a review of work on the economics of marriage, see Nancy R. Burstein, “Economic
Influences on Marriage and Divorce,” 26 J. of Policy Analysis and Management (2007) 387-429.
19  See, e.g., Robert Wood, Marriage Rates and Marriageable Men: A Test of the Wilson
Hypothesis, J. Of Human Resources Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter, 1995), pp. 163-193.   See also,
e.g.,William Julius Wilson,  The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy. 
20  William Julius Wilson,  The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy;  Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, “Socioeconomic Change and the
Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites,” in The Urban Underclass 175, 175 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); See also David T. Ellwood & Jonathan Crane, “Family
Change Among Black Americans: What Do We Know?,” 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives
65, 68-69 (Autumn 1990).
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running through premature death, incarceration, and un-employability) will drive down marriage
rates among groups who suffer these dislocations.18  
In keeping with these predictions, William Julius Wilson has attributed the decades-long
decline in black marriage to a shrinking pool of marriageable men – a theory that has come to be
known as the “Wilson hypothesis.”19  According to Wilson, the departure of the black middle
class from the inner city in the wake of the civil rights revolution, combined with the
disappearance of manufacturing jobs that urban black men had previously performed, led to a
shortage of black men who could support a family.20  Black women responded by bearing and
raising children outside the confines of traditional marriage.
Yet another attempt to explain surging extra-marital childbearing among blacks identifies
early childbearing as an optimal strategy for dealing with economic hardship and social
constraint.   According to Arline Geronimus, unmarried teen motherhood makes sense for black
women because this group suffers poorer health and higher neonatal mortality than other women
throughout their prime childbearing years.  Moreover, by comparing sisters and women from
similar backgrounds, she argues that the economic prospects of black women are not
significantly depressed by teenage motherhood.  In light of these considerations, she concludes
21  Arline T. Geronimus, Teenage Childbearing and Social and Reproductive
Disadvantage: The Evolution of Complex Questions and the Demise of Simple Answers,” 40
Family Relations (October 1991) 463-471, 466.  
22  Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas, Promises I Can Keep.
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that “early fertility-timing distributions among extremely disadvantaged populations, rather than
being irrational as is often supposed, may have an underlying cultural rationale.” 21 
Ethnographers Katherine Edin and Maria Kafalas, in contrast, attribute low marriage
rates among poor women generally to an interplay between the recent economic position of the
poor and working class and a general cultural shift to higher expectations for marriage across the
board.22  From their ethnographic study of 162 single mothers in Philadelphia, these researchers
conclude that economic conditions, in combination with pervasive social trends, thwart less
advantaged women’s strong desire to marry.  They observe that emerging norms now dictate that
success must precede marriage, with a stable job, a home, a savings account, and enough money
for a nice wedding as prerequisites for matrimony.  Because unskilled women and their potential
mates had trouble making good on this goal (in part because the income of the least educated has
not kept pace with higher earnings of college graduates), they postpone matrimony while
accepting the “second best” option of early motherhood.  Although almost all hope to find a
husband eventually, the majority fail to marry at all.  Edin and Kefalas echo these women in
acknowledging the behavioral shortcomings of their prospective mates, including habitual drug
use, domestic violence, poor work records, and law-breaking.  But the authors largely attribute
these patterns to bad schools and lack of economic opportunity.  In short, poor women’s (and
men’s) inability to meet the current high standards for marriage is a product of circumstances.  
Early, extra-marital childbearing is perceived as an rational response to structural forces and
external constraints.
Finally, an influential paper published in 1996 by three economists looks to technological
change as the principal source of rising extra-marital birthrates and the recent retreat from
23  George Akerlof, Janet Yellin, and Michael Katz, “An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States,” 111 Quarterly J. of Economics (1996), 279.
24  For an extended discussion, see Wax, Engines of Inequality, supra, 582-599.
25  David T. Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, “The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent
Families:  What Do We Know?  Where Do We Look for Answers?” supra at 60, 68.  
10
marriage.   Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz,23 argue that the invention of the birth control pill in the
early 1960s, followed by the legalization of abortion shortly thereafter, constituted a significant
“technological shock” that unsettled prior conventions and radically shifted patterns of sexual
behavior.  By reducing the chance of unwanted pregnancy, these developments, dramatically
increased women’s willingness to engage in extra-marital sex.  This made sex more available to
men, and men less willing marry women they impregnated.  The demise of the “shotgun
marriage convention” meant that pregnant women who hoped to marry and become mothers had
no choice but to go it alone.  The paradoxical result was a surge in extra-marital childbearing.
All of these explanations have severe limitations and none succeed in explaining most of
the growing divergence in marital and reproductive behavior by class and race.24  Changes in
male wages, sex ratio imbalances, and a paucity of marriageable men fail to account for most of
the decades long decline in marriage among persons with lower earnings and less education. 
Although marriage rates undeniably respond to economic conditions and some non-marriage can
be attributed to a shortage of marriageable men, there is a consensus among demographers that
only a small portion of the decades long-retreat from marriage and the current dispersion by race
and social class can be attributed to these factors.  Rather, people with profiles similar to those
who have frequently married in the past are now marrying less often.  As two prominent
researchers in the field have observed, although “male earnings and sex ratios clearly influence
marriage,” variations in these factors are “not enough to explain the bulk of recent changes” in
family structure.  That is because “the economic position of men has not changed enough to
explain most of the changes in marriage patterns.”25 
26  See, e.g., David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, “The Spread of Single Parent
Families in the United States Since 1960,” in The Future of the Family 13 (Moynihan, ed.); 
David T. Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, “The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families: 
What Do We Know?  Where Do We Look for Answers?” in  Kathryn M. Neckerman, Ed., Social
Inequality 3-77 (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation) at 60, 68.  
27  Dan Lichter, Diane McLaughlin, George Kephart, and David Landry, “Race and the
retreat from marriage: a shortage of marriageable men?”  57 American Sociological Review
(Dec. 1992) 781-799, 784-785.
28  See, e.g., Robert Lerman, Employment Opportunities of young men and family
formation, 79 American Economic Review (1989) 62-66;  R. Kelly Raley and Megan M.
Sweeney, “Explaining Race and Ethnic Variation in Marriage: Directions for Future Research,”
1 Race Soc. Probl. (2009) 132-142, 133 (noting that significant racial differences in family
patterns also exist “among individuals with relatively high earnings and education.”) 
29  R. Richard Banks and Su Jin Gatlin, “African American Intimacy: The Racial Gap in
Marriage,” 11 Michigan J. Of Race & Law 115, 124 (acknowledging drops in marriage rates for
marriageable men).   See also  David T. Ellwood & Jonathan Crane, “Family Change Among
Black Americans: What Do We Know?,” 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 65, 68-69, 76
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What is true across the board also applies to blacks.  The decline in black marriage rates
has been studied intensively, with social scientists citing incarceration, unemployment, and
educational underachievement as creating a shortfall in the pool of marriageable black men,
especially at the extremes of the socioeconomic distribution.  However, the data reveals that this
shortfall, and economic factors in general, account for a small portion of the drop in marriage
among blacks over the past 50 years.26  As noted by Dan Lichter, the overall economic and social
condition of blacks improved over this period, even as marriage rates relentlessly decreased. 
Indeed, “strict economic explanations are difficult to reconcile with evidence that marriage rates
for blacks in the 1930s were very high – higher than those of whites – despite the fact that black
men had significantly higher rates of unemployment and poverty than they do today.” 27  In
addition, marriage among blacks has declined across the board, regardless of education,
employment, and economic circumstances.28  Specifically, “the most affluent black men now less
likely to have ever been married than their lower earning but economically stable African
American counterparts.”29  In addition, marriage rates for black and white men with similar
(Autumn 1990) (noting that declines in marriage “have been almost as great for better-educated
[black] men as for the less well-educated.”)
30  Banks and Gatlin, supra.
31  See Dan Lichter, et al, 57 American Sociological Review, at 785; Lynn White & Stacy
J. Rogers, “Economic Circumstances and Family Outcomes: A Review of the 1990s,” 62 Journal
of Marriage and Family 1035, 1043 (Nov. 2000) (noting that more than 80% of the decline in
black marriage rates is unexplained by economic and demographic factors); Heather Koball,
“Have African American men become less committed to Marriage?  Explaining the twentieth
century racial cross-over in men’s marriage timing, 35 Demography (1998) 251-258, –
(explaining that ‘employment does a poor job of explaining . . . differential racial patterns in the
timing of marriage acorss the twentieth century.”);  Robert Wood, Marriage Rates and
Marriageable Men: A Test of the Wilson Hypothesis, J. of Human Resources Vol. 30, No. 1
(Winter, 1995) (estimating that a decline in the number of black marriageable men explains only
about 5% of the recent decline in black marriage rates); Robert Schoen and James R. Kluegel,
“The Widening Gap in Black and White Marriage Rates: The Impact of Population Composition
and Differential Marriage Propensities,” American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 895
(estimating that the relative shortage of black marriageable men accounts for between 10 and
25% of  black-white difference in marriage rates); Scott South and Kim Lloyd, “Marriage
Opportunities and Family Formation – further implications of imbalanced sex-ratios,” 54 J. of
Marriage and the Family (1992) 440-451, 449   (noting that “significant racial differences in
marriage rates persist even after racial differences in mate availability are taken into account ”);
R. Kelly Raley and Megan M. Sweeney, “Explaining Race and Ethnic Variation in Marriage:
Directions for Future Research,” 1 Race Soc. Probl. (2009) 132-142, 133 (same).   See also
Madeline Zavodny, “Do Men’s Characteristics Affect Whether a Non-marital Pregnancy Results
in Marriage,” 61 J. Of Marriage and Family (August 1999) 764-773 (noting large unexplained
ethnic differences in the probability of marriage after the birth of a child).  
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education and incomes differ significantly and are growing, with “[b]lack men at every income
level . . . substantially less likely than their white counterparts to have ever been married”30   (In
the same vein, it is also notable that Hispanics complete fewer years of schooling than blacks,
but have significantly higher marriage rates.)  Based on these observations and other evidence,
demographers estimate that, at most, about a fifth of the current black-white difference in
marriage rates is due to a shortage of marriageable men, with some estimates far lower.31  In
short, demographic evidence conclusively repudiates the Wilson hypothesis: economic
circumstances and other variables thought to bear on the number of marriageable men do not
account for most of the decades-long decline in marriage among blacks, nor do they explain the
32  See South and Lloyd, “Marriage Opportunities and Family Formation – further
implications of imbalanced sex-ratios,” 54 J. of Marriage and the Family (1992) at 449 
33  See, e.g., Frank R. Furstenberg, “Teen age Childbearing and Cultural Rationality: A
Thesis in Search of Evidence,” 41 Family Relations (1992) 239-243, 242 (citing data showing
that early chidbearers have lower educational attainment and poorer economic prospects than
poor women who delay childbearing).
34  Robert I Lerman, “The Impact of the Changing US Family Structure on Child Poverty
and Income Inequality,” 63 Economica (1996), S119-139, S137
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large disparity in marriage rates between blacks and other groups.  Rather, “a complete
explanation of racial differences in marriage behavior will clearly require consideration of
nondemographic variables.”32  
 Likewise, Arline Geronimus’s assertion that early extra-marital childbearing is a
“rational” strategy for disadvantaged black women has been attacked as unsupported by the
facts.33  Her analysis also fails to explain reproductive patterns overall.  Geronimus’s
observations are based on a very disadvantaged cohort of mostly black women.  Her sample does
not represent the spectrum of black single mothers, most of whom are better educated, wealthier,
and older.  In addition, her analysis is based on a restricted counterfactual: she compares teen
mothers to otherwise similar women who delay non-marital childbearing a few years.  She does
not consider the possibility of postponing childbearing until after marriage, and does not
compare her population to black women who marry before bearing children.  Therefore, her
work fails to address whether extra-marital childbearing, whether either early or late, is better or
worse than a more conventional path.  This oversight ignores strong contrary evidence that
marriage carries significant benefits, both economic and otherwise, for women in every
sociodemographic group.   According to Robert Lerman, for example, the decline in two-parent
families accounted for “almost half the increase in child income inequality and more than the
entire rise in child poverty rates” observed between 1971 and 1989.34   Although the breakdown
hurt all children, black children were most affected.  According to Lerman’s estimate, pairing
35  Robert I Lerman, “The Impact of the Changing US Family Structure on Child Poverty
and Income Inequality,” 63 Economica (1996) at 136.  This estimate incorporates a marital
earnings premium of the magnitude that is currently observed for black men.  But even without
factoring in that boost in earnings, the estimate is that 43% of black children would escape
poverty. 
36  See, e.g., Audrey Light, “Gender Differences in the Marriage and Cohabitation
Income Premium, 41 Demography May 2004, 263-284 (women experience substantial financial
gains from marriage and stable cohabitation); Steven Nock, “The Consequences of Premarital
Fatherhood,” 63 American Sociological Review (1998), 250-263 (concluding that men who have
children before marriage obtain less education and lower earnings, and have higher poverty rates
than comparable men who did not father children outside marriage);  Robert I. Lerman, How Do
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Single Parenthood Affect the Material Hardships of Families With
Children?  9-10 (Urban Institute and American University, July 2002).  
See also Paul Amato and Rebecca Maynard, “Decreasing Non-marital Births and
Strengthening Marriage to Reduce Poverty,” 17 The Future of Children (Fall 2007) 117-141;
David Eggebeen and Daniel Lichter, “Race, Family Structure, and Changing Poverty among
American Children,” 56 American Sociological Review (1991) 801-817; Robert I. Lerman, “The
Impact of the Changing US Family Structure on Child Poverty and Income Inequality,” 63
Economica (1996), S119-139; Ron Haskins, “Getting Ahead in America,” National Affairs (Fall
2009) 36-52; Adam Thomas and Isabel Sawhill, “For Love and Money?  The Impact of Family
Structure on Family Income,” 15 The Future of Children (Fall 2005) 57-74; John Iceland, “Why
Poverty Remains High: The Role of Income Growth, Economic Inequality, and Changes in
Family Structure, 1949-1999,” 40 Demography (2003) 499-519; Ron Haskins and Elizabeth
Sawhill, Creating an Opportunity Society (2009).
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black single mothers in1989 with the existing population of black males would move “80% of
the children . . . out of poverty as a result of the pooling of incomes and the marriage-induced
earnings.”35  Other studies also suggest that marriage is effective in lifting many mothers and
children out of poverty.36
The empirical data thus suggests that the economic benefits of marriage are available
across the earnings spectrum.  It also contradicts the notion that the educated and affluent marry
more often because they can expect outsized benefits from joining forces – an explanation that
ignores both existing data and basic economic logic.  Individuals with modest earning power can
improve their position by finding a partner with similar prospects.  That marriage can
significantly boost well-being regardless of social class stands to reason.  First, marriage gives
37  See Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality, at 585-586
38  See, e.g., Adam Thomas and Isabel Sawhill, “For Love and Money?  The Impact of
Family Structure on Family Income,” 15 The Future of Children (Fall 2005) at 61; see also Larry
Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu, “Trends in Cohabitation and implications for children’s family
contexts in the United States,” 54 Population Studies (2000) 29-41 (noting the greater instability
of cohabiting families, and implications for children).
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households two potential workers instead of one.   Indeed, the basic principles governing the
marginal utility of money dictate that the added earnings of working class men have as much or
greater value to women of modest means than large male incomes have for women who also can
also command high salaries.37  Thus, marrying someone of roughly equal earning capacity,
regardless of skill level, is an effective way for men and women to improve their economic
prospects and increase their standard of living.  In addition, couples in every social class can take
advantage of economies of scale, shared responsibilities, and efficient divisions of labor. 
Although cohabitation would appear to serve these purposes as well, the data indicates that
cohabiting unions are less stable than marriages.  In general, “cohabitation does not signify the
same degree of commitment as does marriage, and is in fact usually less durable.”   The evidence
confirms that cohabiting unions are marked by fewer long-term investments and planning,
produce less specialization and pooling of resources, are associated with a smaller wage
premium for men, and provide a less cohesive and stable setting for children.38  
Discussions of declining marriage rates among the less advantaged in all ethnic groups,
including whites, often point to rising inequality in male earnings.  The divergence is due mostly
to a decades-long surge in the economic returns to college and advanced education, which has
greatly enhanced the incomes of men with college or professional degrees.  In contrast, the
economic position of working class men has not kept pace.  Although estimates vary based on
methodology and reveal some fluctuations, most calculations indicate that earnings for men with
39  See, e.g., David Autor, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney, “Trends in U.S. Wage
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 90 Review of Economics and Statistics (May 2008), 300-
323; Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, “Long-Run Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure: 
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing, Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Sept. 2007,
unpublished paper on file with author, (noting that enhanced returns to education beyond high
school have been a “key component of the rise in wage dispersion since 1980");  Lawrence Katz,
and David H. Autor, "Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality," in Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of labor economics. Vol. 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science, North- Holland, 1999, pp. 1463-1555 (noting evidence that earnings and compensation
for the least educated men stagnated or declined from the 1970s through the 1990s).  Compare
Marvin H. Kosters, Schooling, Work Experience, and Wage Trends, The American Economic
Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association (May, 1990), pp. 308-312, 310 (stating that after stabilizing
during the 1970s, wages for high school educated men declined by approximately 12% during
the 1980s.)  In general, see U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables: Tables P32-P35:
Educational Attainment and Years of School Completed-Full-Time, Year-Round Workers 18
Years Old and Over by Mean Earnings, Age and Sex: 1974-2008
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/incpertoc.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010)
(showing a modest decline followed by a stabilization in earnings of male workers with a high
school education over 33 year period).
40  Oral communication, Dan Lichter, Department of Policy Analysis and Management
and Professor of Sociology, Cornell University.
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high school or less have stagnated or declined somewhat over this period.39  Even though some
men in this category have struggled, and some well-paying working class jobs have disappeared,
the question nevertheless remains as to how much of the retreat from marriage among less
educated men can be attributed to changes in their earning power over time.  Answering this
question requires a precise and systematic comparison of the marital profiles of similarly situated
men over time.  This requires comparing the behavior of men today with men who had
comparable earnings in the past, when marriage rates were significantly higher.  Is a man who
makes, say, $28,000 per year in today’s dollars – or any similar working class wage – as likely to
be married now as a man who made a comparable, inflation adjusted amount in 1950 or 1970?  
Inexplicably, there appears to be no study in the literature that makes this precise comparison
across the spectrum of earnings.40   However, the limited research available suggests that men
who were once regarded as marriageable and were routinely married– including many men with
41  One paper looks at a relatively small sample of men and women partners to determine
which pairs marry shortly after the birth of a child.  It then compares the men in this sample with
similar men in the past (e.g. with the same earnings and other sociodemographic characteristics)
to determine whether their chance of marrying after the birth of a child was higher or lower.  The
author finds that the probability of a man marrying the mother of his child, holding male
characteristics constant, has declined significantly for blacks, and less so for whites.  For white
men, specifically, the data indicate that lower probabilities of marriage are due in part to "a
change in men's characteristics" and partly to "a change in their response to characteristics." 
This indicates that both culture and economics have played a role in the retreat from marriage in
this situation.  See Madeline Zavodny, “Do Men’s Characteristics Affect Whether a Non-marital
Pregnancy Results in Marriage,” 61 J. of Marriage and Family (August 1999) at 770-772.  See
also Daniel Lichter and Diane McLaughlin, “Economic Restructuring and the Retreat from
Marriage,” 31 Social Science Research (2002) 230-256 (also suggesting that changes in men’s
response to their characteristics (such as education and earnings), rather than in the
characteristics themselves, accounts for most of the change in the probability of marriage, albeit
much more for blacks than for whites.)  
42  See David T. Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, “The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent
Families:  What Do We Know?  Where Do We Look for Answers?” in  Kathryn M. Neckerman,
Ed., Social Inequality 3-77 (New York:  Russell Sage Foundation), at 68 (noting that “the wages
of less skilled men and women rose” and “jobs became plentiful” during the 1990s, while
marriage continued to decline and extra-marital childbearing to increase).  See also, e.g., David
Autor, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney, “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the
Revisionists, 90 Review of Economics and Statistics (May 2008), 300-323 (wages for less
educated men stabilized and even grew modestly during the 1990s, when marriage rates
continued to decline). 
43  Goldstein and Kenney, “Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone? New Cohort
Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women” 66 American Sociological Review (2001)
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earnings in the lower end of the distribution – are now more likely to remain single than in the
past.41   Moreover, the retreat from marriage has continued through good economic times and
bad, persisting through periods when working class wages stabilized or gained ground, as in the
1990s.42  As already noted, a similar trend is evident among women:  marriage rates for high
school graduates have relentlessly fallen, and college educated women are now more likely to
marry than less educated women.43  The reason for this pattern is not apparent.  That these
women’s potential partners have lower incomes than men with a college degree does not change
the fact that they still bring valuable resources to the table.  Yet, in contrast to the past, women
44  See Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality, supra.
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and men in this cohort now marry less frequently, and have less stable relationships, than people
with higher education and earnings.
In sum, although the benefits of marriage are potentially available to persons across the
sociodemographic spectrum, the gains are being realized selectively as behavior has diverged by
race and class over time.  Arguably, large numbers of people who forgo marriage are not
behaving “rationally”: their choices are making them poorer, less secure, and less well off than if
they joined forces, and these adversities are also being visited on their children.44  Since the
groups who are less likely to marry (including the less educated and blacks) are also at greater
risk of poverty, remaining single appears to be against economic self-interest.   
Of course, marriage is not simply a financial arrangement.  Its potential to make people
better off depends on the behavior of the partners: they must work hard and consistently, actively
cooperate, and apply their income and efforts to a common enterprise.  These are important
caveats: marriage delivers few benefits if the partners do not live up to these standards.  This
suggests that how partners behave within marriage, and in preparation for it, might influence
who marries and stays married.  If these factors make a difference, this begs the question of
whether, and how, it might account for the growing dispersion by race and class.  
Are some people better socialized to marriage than others?  The work of Kathryn Edin
and Maria Kefalas provides some hints.  As noted, these authors seek to explain declining
marriage rates among low income women as the joint product of general cultural trends and
economic conditions.  The modest financial prospects confronting these women and their
potential partners means they cannot fulfill vaunted expectations for marriage.  The result is that
they have children, but don’t get married.   The problem with this theory is that it does not
square with the explanations these women offer for their own choices.   They almost never
complain of their potential husbands’ modest earning power (which the authors themselves
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concede has not changed much since the 1960s and 1970s, when working class marriage rates
were far higher).  Rather, their main quarrel is with men’s behavior.  Although anti-social
behavior is a problem across the board, most of the women highlight their partners’ repeated and
flagrant sexual infidelities, which often produce children by other women.  The conflicting
loyalties and ill-will generated by these patterns emerge as significant obstacles to stable and
harmonious relationships.  In general, the overall impression gleaned from these women’s
accounts is that their potential marriage partners are poorly socialized to the expectations of
marriage and unwilling to fulfill a husband’s proper role.  At the same time, however, women are
somewhat complicit in their men’s behavior, because they do not hold out for marriage as a
condition of having children.  Whether deliberately or accidentally, they routinely bear children
out of wedlock by men they would not consider marrying – children who reduce their prospects
of finding a mate in the future.
These patterns of behavior impede the formation of potentially economically beneficial
unions.  In short, this study suggest that the failure of these women’s partners’ to act as good
husbands is the main reason for the mothers’ reluctance to marry them.  Likewise, women’s
willingness to bear children outside of marriage, and their failure to prevent pregnancy through
the effective use of contraception, further impedes the formation of stable unions.  No direct
evidence is offered, however, on whether the standard of male behavior has deteriorated over
time, and the authors do not address that question.
Likewise, Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz, fail to address emerging race and class differences,
or to explore underlying behaviors that might give rise to these patterns.  According to their
theory, the wider availability of extra-marital sex after 1960 spelled the demise of shotgun
marriage, which caused out of wedlock childbearing to soar.  But their theory does not show why
extra-marital births increased so much among blacks and less educated women, while changing
little among women with more education.  Nor does it explain why more privileged women
continue to embrace marriage as a prerequisite to motherhood.   Likewise, the model gives no
45  See Kay Hymowitz, Marriage and Caste in America.
46  See, e.g., Edin and Reed, “Why Don’t They Just Get Married?  Barriers to Marriage
among the Disadvantaged,” 15 The Future of Children (Fall 2005) at 129 (noting that poor
women have high aspirations for marriage).  See also discussion, infra.
47    Brad Wilcox, "Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonweal," in Robert George and
Jean Elshtain, The Meaning of Marriage, at 244. 
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reason why upper middle class men are routinely willing to acquiesce in women’s demands for
marriage before motherhood, whereas less privileged men more often resist such demands.  
             Commentators who assign a large role to cultural norms in family life seek to address
these very questions.  Hymowitz speculates that a growing understanding of the central role of
marriage in building and maintaining financial and human capital, both for adults and their
offspring, contributes to better educated person’s willingness to marry and stay married, as
reflected in continuing low extra-marital birth rates and a dramatic decline in divorce rates in
recent decades.  According to Kay Hymowitz, educated men and women appear to appreciate the
economic and non-economic benefits of marriage, including the critical importance of a stable
home life and sustained parental investment to their children’s future educational success and
well-being. 45  But the willingness of more affluent parents to buck demographic trends in the
interests of status reproduction only begs the question of why persons from other
sociodemographic groups are relatively unwilling to take similar steps to improve their
children’s status.  Likewise, it is a mystery why less privileged individuals, unlike their better off
counterparts, either fail to appreciate that marriage can make them better off, or are unmoved by
the potential advantages – to themselves and their children – of maintaining long-term
relationships.  To be sure, there is some evidence that people in all sociodemographic sectors
revere and aspire to marriage.46  But that just reinforces the puzzle of why fewer people now act
on the insight that “their lifestyle, and the lifestyle of their children, will be markedly better if
they form a long-term social and economic partnership – that is, marriage – with one person.”47    
This paper seeks to shed fresh light on this question.   As noted, social scientists seeking
21
to explain demographic shifts have embraced a version of a rational actor model that traces
variations in behavior to objectively measurable ambient conditions.  As we have seen, however,
this approach falls short of accounting for observed patterns.  Financial circumstances, material
constraints, and society-wide shifts in economic expectations, do not fully explain either
longitudinal trends over time, or the existing cross-sectional divergence in marriage, divorce,
childbearing, and family structure.  The retreat from marriage among the less privileged is
especially puzzling, because the benefits of a well-functioning marriage, including economies of
scale and gains from cooperation, would appear to be especially valuable for individuals with
less earning power and fewer skills and resources.  Although marriage seems like a good choice
and an optimal strategy, those who would appear to benefit most are less likely to choose it. 
In sum, rational actor models that focus on responses to social conditions have shed little
light on the growing divergence in behavior by class and race in patterns of marriage and
parenthood.  A different approach is in order.  My purpose here is to propose one.  In attempting
to improve on the shortcomings of existing theories, my model rejects the notion that group
disparities can be explained by positing a unitary “rational” response to the peculiar
circumstances confronting distinct sociodemographic groups.  Instead of linking choices directly
to external conditions (either economic of social), this model turns inward to examine modes of
thought and action that inform the decisionmaking process, and the individual and group
characteristics that influence these.  The proposed explanation does not turn on external
conditions, but looks to what is going on in people’s heads.  How people think about costs and
benefits – specifically as they relate to sexual and related conduct bearing on the quality of
interpersonal relationships – is what matters most.  By showing how similar circumstances can
issue in distinct patterns of behavior, this framework attempts to explain why people often
behave very differently despite similar incentives and constraints.  In tracing variations in family
structure to distinct modes of response, this approach challenges a theory of unitary rationality,
which predicts a standard reaction to similar circumstances and assigns a minimal role to cultural
48  R.J. Herrnstein, Behavior, Reinforcement, and Utility, 4 Psychological Science 217-
224, 219 (1990); see also, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein, Rational Choice Theory: Necessary but not
Sufficient, 45 American Psychologist 356-367 (March 1990).
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background or individual or group attributes.  In contrast, this analysis posits that different
methods for processing the same information, and assessing similar costs and benefits, can
decisively influence behavior.  Divergent modes of thinking can give rise to dramatically
different approaches to personal and family life.  
III.  Rational choice: local versus global decisionmaking
The model proposed here draws on an important body of work on the psychology of
decisionmaking.  The analysis posits alternative modes of choice, corresponding to different
time-frames for assessing behavioral options.  It beings with the observation that some choices
that are immediately attractive will not necessarily maximize well-being in the long run.  Rather,
achieving the highest returns may depend on adopting an approach that anticipates and totals up
the benefits of a series of choices over time.   To adopt the parlance of the model, an individual
may sometimes be better off with a “global” rather than a “local” approach to decisionmaking.
The account makes use of paradigm developed by Richard Herrnstein and his colleagues
at Harvard, which explores the dynamics of long term and short term frameworks for choice.  In
a series of paper, Herrnstein explained how short time frames for decisionmaking can sometimes
lead to suboptimal results.  He draws on experimental observations that animals and people tend
to select an immediately attractive option even if forgoing that option in favor of a different
choice might produce a larger benefit over time.  According to Herrnstein, a person might
“credit, as it were, the immediate returns he receives to a particular response alternative, rather
than to keep a global account of returns across his entire repertoire.” 48  As he explains, “[t]his
limitation in mental bookkeeping entails a limitation in our general capacity to discover the
optimal allocation of our behavior, although particular circumstances determine whether the
49  Id. at __
50  Gene Heyman, Addiction: A Disorder of Choice (Harvard University Press 2009).
51  Heyman at 18-19.
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limitation is grave, trivial, or in certain cases, nonexistent.” 49  The myopic method of assessment
is designated “local choice.”  This stands in contrast to an aggregative method for evaluating
options, known as “global choice.”
A.  Local vs. global choice: drug addiction
 Gene Heyman has elaborated on Herrnstein’s decisionmaking model to argue that drug
addiction is a “disorder of choice.” 50  According to Heyman, drug addiction results from the
chronic failure to engage in global decision-making, which leads to suboptimal behavior. 
Heyman’s theory of addiction stands in contrast to the widely accepted notion of habitual drug
use as a “disease” characterized by compulsions, cravings, and seemingly uncontrollable seeking
and use.  On the view, repetitive drug use is conduct over which addicts have no meaningful
voluntary control.  Therefore drug addiction is not a matter of choice, and cannot be tamed
through incentives, punishment, or other conventional methods for modifying behavior.  Rather,
the proper response to addiction is medical treatment.51   
The disease model is popular because the compulsive use of alcohol or illegal drugs
seems irrational and dysfunctional.  Why would someone voluntarily engage in behavior that is
obviously detrimental to their well-being?  In addition, many addicts deplore their habits and
express the desire to quit.  Yet despite understanding the terrible costs of their behavior, they fail
to act on this perception.
 The disease model is appealing because it helps to explain such self-defeating behaviors. 
The biological and physiological mechanisms behind addiction hijack the ability to weigh the
costs of drug use against other benefits.  Changes in the brain make drug-seeking natural and
predictable – they transform drug use into “rational” behavior.  In light of the overwhelming
52  Id. At 119.  
53  Heyman, at 119.
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need for drugs, there is no reason to expect the addict to reform or even resist.
           In fact, as Gene Heyman argues, many addicts overcome their addiction.  Contrary to
popular perception, many people use drugs for some period of time and quit.  Or they
spontaneously stop using drugs despite long periods of prior use and entrenched habits.  Other
people, however, do not – or they recover and relapse repeatedly.  What accounts for these 
successes and failures?  Although life circumstances have some influence, they don’t fully
explain observed patterns.  For persons matched on background, education, financial resources,
and other objective characteristics, some will kick the habit and others not.  A disease model that
views addiction as essentially involuntary cannot easily account for these differences.  If
compulsive drug use is impervious to will, incentive, and choice, then responses to addiction
should not vary so much.  Likewise, a choice model that posits a unitary calculus of rational
decisionmaking falls short of explaining why some people engage in harmful, costly, self-
destructive behavior, while others refrain or permanently abjure drugs.
Heyman’s position is that, although overcoming addiction and may be difficult and
requires confronting strong desires, drug use is a choice that is amenable to voluntary control. 
Heyman’s challenge to the disease model rests on the recognition that human psychology admits
of more than one method of rational choice.  Heyman’s picture of compulsive drug use builds on
Richard Herrnstein’s observation that decision-making can occur within alternative frameworks. 
“It is always possible to choose between available items one at a time, or to organize the items
into sequences and then choose between different sequences.”52  In keeping with Herrnstein’s
framework, the method of choosing between options one at a time, or piecemeal, Heyman
designates as  “local” choice.   “In local choice, selecting the better option means choosing the
item that currently has the higher value.”53   In making that choice, the person compares the
54  Id. at 119
55  Heyman at –.
56   Heyman at 125.
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immediate short-term benefits from the available options and ignores future consequences.   
In contrast, taking into account the aggregate payoff from different sequences constitutes 
“global” choice.  An actor makes a global choice by tallying the costs and benefits of a set of
choices over time and selecting the sequence that maximizes payoff.  “In global choice, the best
choice is the collection or sequence of items that has higher value.”54  
 How might the strategies generated by global or local choice affect patterns of drug use? 
According to Heyman, whether or not someone compulsively uses drugs is a function of whether
that person adopts a local or global perspective on choice.   As Heyman notes, “[l]ocal choice is
simple,” but it has severe shortcomings.  Specifically, “it ignores the dynamics that link choice
and change in value.”55  Thus, the decision to use, or to continue to use, drugs can be explained
as a failure to appreciate how those choices change the value of subsequent ones, and to take that
interplay into account.  How do prior choices affect future choices in the case of drugs?   
Heyman posits that the payoffs from a particular decision to indulge in drugs depends on
whether and how often drugs were used on preceding days.  In particular, Heyman makes the
critical assumption that a discrete episode of drug use undermines both the value of any
subsequent decision to indulge and also the value of a subsequent drug-free day.   As drug use
increases, the “high” from more drugs decreases.  Likewise, “as drug use increases, the value of
the competing nondrug activities decreases.”56  That is, drugs undermine the benefits of
subsequent abstinence.  That is because drug use erodes the quality of alternatives to drugs,
which include the ordinary activities of life.  The ability to discharge daily responsibilities, work
effectively, enjoy leisure pursuits, and carry on a normal family and social life are all
significantly compromised.  Thus, although the decision to use drugs undeniably generates an
57  Id. at 119
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attractive and immediate “high,” it has a corrosive effect on the subsequent benefits to be derived
both from additional drug use and from its alternatives.   
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c demonstrate this dynamic for a stylized 30-day period.  Figure 1a, 
which illustrates local choice, plots the value of each day (whether of drug use or abstinence)
against the number of drug choices in the last 30 days.   The horizontal axis represents the
number of prior drug days within the 30-day period.  The vertical axis shows that the current
value of each discrete day of drug use (see top line), or each day of abstinence from drugs (see
bottom line), decreases as the number of previous drug days increases.  Thus, the value of the
decision to use or abstain from drugs is seen to decline with prior drug use.  In short, the
schedule assigns a larger payoff to a drug free day if preceded by more drug-free days and a
smaller payoff if preceded by more episodes of drug use.  Nonetheless, the daily value of drug
use always exceeds the daily value of abstaining from drugs.  Therefore, the day-to-day “rational
choice” is to use drugs every day, generating a pattern of 30 days of drug use and no days of
abstinence.  The “local choice” equilibrium is continuous and compulsive drug use.  
Figures 1b and 1c, in contrast, illustrate the dynamic of adopting a global point of view. 
Once again, the horizontal axis represents the number of prior drug days within the 30-day
period.  The vertical axis in figure 1b plots the total value of the “market basket” combination of
drug and non-drug days over the entire 30-day period for each discrete combination of drug and
non-drug days.  The vertical axis in figure 1c plots the average value of each day based on the
total “market basket” value over the entire 30-day period for each combination of drug and non-
drug days.  (This is obtained by dividing the aggregate, or “market basket” total for each 30 day
combination by 30.)  As with local choice, the global choice option “reflect[s] the dynamic
relationships between choice and changes in value.”57  But computing payoffs based on a global
perspective generates a very different result: “the 30 day sequence with the highest value [is] the
58  Heyman at 127.
59  Id. at 119; see also id. At Id. at 116-124.  Indeed, the pattern generated by different
methods of calculating costs and benefits was first described by Herrnstein and his colleagues in
the context of deciding which of two restaurants (Chinese or Italian) to visit on successive
nights.  In that example, as with drug use, the subjective value of each choice depends on the
pattern of choices that precedes it.  And the gains from a strategy pursued over time is reflected
in a global perspective, which takes the sequence of prior choices into account.  In the restaurant
example, the relative value of Chinese food versus Italian food changes over time as a function
of how often each option has previously been chosen – specifically, the value of Chinese food
declines and the pleasure of Italian food increases as more Chinese meals are eaten, and vice-
27
one that contains no drug days.”58  Whereas the equilibrium for local choice is “always use
drugs,” the equilibrium for global choice is “never do.”   
In the case of addiction, the global perspective reveals that using drugs is always a losing
strategy when considered in the aggregate and over the long term: the equilibrium pattern or
optimization from a global choice perspective is complete abstinence.  Although a person who
takes his pleasure one day at a time will use drugs compulsively, a person who thinks globally
will never use drugs, even though drugs provide more satisfaction on a day to day basis than
alternatives.  The key to understanding this paradox is that drug use undermines future benefits
both from taking drugs and from refraining from drugs.  The global value declines relentlessly
with each drug day, so that the positive gains accumulated using drugs over this period can never
compensate for the deterioration in the quality of non-drug days.  The corrosive effect of drugs
on non-drug days means that it is never worthwhile to take drugs even once.  
B.  Local vs. global choice: marriage and reproduction
This difference between local and global decisionmaking is critical to the observation
that choices that maximize individuals payoffs in the short term – and thus are “rational” from a
myopic perspective –  can result in a decline in welfare when repetitively pursued over time, and
thus can be regarded as dysfunctional overall.   As Gene Heyman observes, there are many
choice sets that exemplify this pattern.  All are characterized by a typical “dynamic relationship
between choice and changes in value.”59
versa.  A strategy informed only by considering the nightly relative dining pleasure generates a
different pattern of selection than a “market-basket” approach that asks which sequence of
dining generates the most dining pleasure overall.   See also R.J. Herrnstein, Rational Choice
Theory: Necessary but not Sufficient, 45 American Psychologist 356-367 (March 1990) at 360
(developing a parallel dynamic example of deciding  between using two types of tennis shots
over the course of a tennis game).  
60  Ethnographers report on repeated affirmations by unmarried mothers and fathers of the
importance, desirability, and value of marriage and an expressed aversion to divorce. See, e.g.,
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 A similar dynamic applies by analogy to decisions about personal and sexual behavior.
Because observed patterns of childbearing, marriage, and divorce are the product of myriad
choices people make over their lives, decisions regarding family formation and reproduction are
prime candidates for analysis as the product of alternative modes of rational decisionmaking. 
Important similarities between drug addiction and intimate behaviors speak to the potential
relevance of this model.   First, starting about 50 years ago, a significant dispersion emerged in
behaviors related both to drug use and reproductive behavior.  For drugs, some people reacted to
the greater availability of and tolerance for drugs by engaging in compulsive drug use or
becoming addicted, whereas others, despite some experimentation, kept their drug use within
bounds.  Likewise, for sexual and reproductive conduct, some people took advantage of looser
mores in some ways (for example, by engaging in premarital sex) while continuing to adhere to
traditional patterns of family life (by getting and staying married), whereas others rejected past
practices in all respects.  In both cases, patterns of response were not evenly distributed
throughout the population.  
Second, in both arenas, significant numbers of people routinely and repeatedly appear to
engage in “irrational,” self-defeating, or maladaptive behaviors.  Their decisions often appear
contrary to their own best interests and harmful to family and loved ones.  In addition, there
exists a disjunction between professed ideals and behavior.   Persons from groups with low
marriage rates and fragile partnerships often express reverence for traditional relationships and
purport to hold marriage in high regard.  And they aspire to marriage for themselves.60  
e.g., Edin and Reed, “Why Don’t They Just Get Married?  Barriers to Marriage among the
Disadvantaged,” 15 The Future of Children (Fall 2005);  Renata Forste, “Maybe Someday:
Marriage and Cohabitation among Low-Income Fathers,” in L. Kowaleski-Jones and N.
Wolfinger, eds., Fragile Families and the Marriage Agenda (Springer 2006) 189-209.  Some
commentators believe that less educated persons are especially driven by a fear of divorce, with
the high failure rate of marriages within this group fueling a greater reluctance to enter into
marriage in the first place.  See, e.g., Edin and Reed, “Why Don’t They Just Get Married? 
Barriers to Marriage among the Disadvantaged, 15 The Future of Children (Fall 2005) at 129
(“Policymakers must realize that one reason why poor men and women may hold the economic
and relationship bar to marriage so high is that they are strongly averse to divorce and are
convinced that divorce makes a mockery of an institution they revere.”) 
61  See Edin and Reed, supra; Renata Forste, supra.  In fact, the evidence suggests a more
complex picture.  As Andrew Cherlin observes, “women in low-income neighborhoods . . don’t
think having children early will hurt their chances of marrying later and don’t think it’s
embarrassing.”  Moreover, almost half the women Cherlin surveyed agreed that “it is not
important for a woman to get married,” a statement that the author observes represents a
“cultural sea change since the mid-twentieth century.”  Andrew Cherlin, The Marriage-Go-
Round, at 166.  For men, the ethnographic picture is similarly mixed, with some working class
men claiming to aspire to marriage, while others, especially in disadvantaged, inner city
neighborhoods, expressing reluctance to commit to monogamy and a macho desire to “play the
field.” See, e.g., Renata Forste, “Maybe Someday: Marriage and Cohabitation among Low-
Income Fathers,” in L. Kowaleski-Jones and N. Wolfinger, eds., Fragile Families and the
Marriage Agenda (Springer 2006) 189-209.  See also, e.g., Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street:
Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City ; Orlando Patterson, Rituals of Blood:
Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries.  
62  The failure of aspirations is captured by the following description of the growing class
divide: 
[S]imple familial stability have become part of the package of private privileges available to the
well-to-do. * * *  [I]n today's society, traditional values have become aspirational. Lower-
income individuals simply live in a much more disrupted society * * * than do the middle- and
upper-middle class people they want to be like.”  Garance Franke-Ruta, Remapping the Culture
Debate, American Prospect, Feb. 2006. 
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Although the evidence is sketchy and mainly anecdotal, poor women – and men – frequently say
they desire to marry “some day.”61  Nonetheless, significant and growing numbers fail to do so.62
 The combination of vaunting goals and the failure to achieve them is often cited as
evidence that attitudes towards marriage do not differ significantly across social groups.  As
discussed already, social scientists point to economic barriers and resource-based impediments
63  See note – supra.
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as the primary causes of disparate marriage rates.  On this view, adverse circumstances, not
variations in values, account for the gap between stated objectives and their achievement.  In
fact, however, the observed disjunction invites comparison with addiction.  Like the desire to be
drug free, the desire to achieve a stable and enduring marriage often fails to translate into the
steps needed to reach that goal.  Although the poor and less educated claim to venerate
traditional family life, these ideals are abstract.63   The connection between intentions and the
conduct that makes good on them will not necessarily be obvious even to persons who sincerely
embrace conventional objectives.  Lofty sentiments need not translate into the more
particularized perceptions, inclinations, and actions that help sustain long-term relationships. 
Because goals may prove otiose absent the daily habits of thought and action needed to execute
them, persons who venerate marriage will not necessarily appreciate how their own decisions
can frustrate their objectives.  They may not see how to get from where they are to where they
wish to be.   
The analysis proposed here helps address this dissonance and the puzzle of family
collapse.  The contention here is that the patterns of marital and reproductive behavior observed
today reflect a disparity in the propensity of individuals from different sociodemographic groups
to adopt local or global methods of decisionmaking in the conduct of their intimate lives.  The
decisions that people make in this sphere routinely confront them with the option of adopting a
myopic, or “local” perspective involving a short term assessment of costs and benefits, or a
“global” framework for evaluating choices more broadly in light of an overall life plan.  The
dynamic described  below demonstrates how these two different modes of choice can generate
starkly disparate in patterns of family formation and reproduction, ranging from high rates of
marriage, marital longevity, and traditional two-parent families to seemingly “dysfunctional”
patterns of unstable, short-lived, and often simultaneous liaisons, single parenthood, and
fatherless families. 
64  For example, after the first thrill and an idyllic period, the relationship may lose some
value as partners work out areas of conflict or tension.  It should also be noted that this version
of the model does not rest on the assumption that sexual exclusivity enhances relationship
quality over time, although that may often be true. 
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In trying to develop an explanation for observed behaviors, the analysis below posits two
stylized scenarios that face individuals seeking to form and maintain intimate relationships.  In
both, an individual is assumed to embark on an initial relationship with a person of the opposite
sex.  The person then encounters an opportunity to cheat on that relationship by forming another
“illicit” liaison.  In the first (the simultaneous relationship scenario), the person will decide
whether and how to carry on both relationships simultaneously.  In the second (the switching
scenario), he (or she) will decide whether and when to abandon the first relationship and form an
alternative relationship with the new partner.  
a.  Simultaneous partners:  the decision to be faithful or unfaithful 
 The model starts with an exclusive sexual relationship.  This relationship may have
recently formed or may have endured for some fixed period.  This initial partnership is marked
by mutual attraction and is fundamentally satisfying to both parties.  The relationship may
increase in value for both partners as trust and intimacy builds, or it may fluctuate over time.64  
The simultaneous partnership model posits a 30-day period in the life of this initial
relationship.  Whether newly minted or of longer duration, the relationship reaches the point
where it offers each partner a designated daily benefit.  As depicted on Table 2, the partners
begin the relevant period with 28 units each of  “relationship capital,” or value to each.  (For
simplicity, it is assumed that each partner enjoys the same payoff for each day.  Although many
relationships will deviate from this premise, it is not essential to the model and can be varied in
further refinements, as noted below).  At the beginning of the period in Table 2, however, one
partner (or the other) confronts the option to “defect” from the relationship by being sexually
unfaithful or embarking on an affair.   For simplicity, the chart looks at the choices facing one of
the partners over a 30-day period.  Each day within the period, the potentially unfaithful partner
65  See Heyman at 119.
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must decide whether to succumb to the temptation of the illicit liaison on that day.  Table 2
reveals a
 hypothetical pattern of payoffs that guides the partner’s choices over the course of a 30-day
period. 
 Table 2 lists possible combinations of faithful and unfaithful days over a 30 day period. 
The choice to be faithful (F-day) or unfaithful (un-F day) on any given day yields a net benefit or
payoff, reflecting the immediate value of each option as listed in the third and fourth columns,
respectively, of Table 2.  This schedule of benefits from each choice over the 30-day period is
graphed in Figure 2.   The schedule has two key features.  First, on a day by day basis, being
unfaithful always promises more benefits than remaining faithful.  The assigned values reveal
that the prospect of engaging in an illicit sexual encounter on any particular day is always more
attractive than the alternative: the initial episode of infidelity yields 30 units of benefit for the
defecting partner, which exceeds that day’s payoff of 28 units from remaining faithful, and so on
for the possible permutations over the 30 day period.   A second key element of the schedule is
that the value of each choice for each day is dynamically related to the partner’s prior conduct –
that is, the number of times within the period that the partner has already chosen to be unfaithful.
To paraphrase Gene Heyman, each daily decision  “reflects the dynamic relationships between
choice and changes in value.”  65  (In modeling this dynamic, it is assumed, as with the drug
example, that the actual sequence of faithful and unfaithful days within the period does not
matter – all that matters is the frequency of each.  Thus, for simplicity, the table represents the
combination of x days of infidelity and (30-x) days of fidelity as an initial sequence of x days
followed by the choice whether to continue that sequence, or not).   In keeping with the parallel
dynamic of addiction, the yield from a day of fidelity, or a day of infidelity, declines as the
decision to be unfaithful is made more frequently and the total numbers of episodes of infidelity
within the pertinent period increase.  
66  Heyman, at 119.
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These features of the payoff scheme generate a situation in which how a person will
“rationally” choose among available options depends on the framework for choice.  As with the
drug example, the course of action will vary with whether the decision-maker adopts a local or
global perspective.  As an initial matter, the affair is desirable: the extra-curricular love interest
is more attractive than the initial partner.  Indeed, that is the case on each and every day.  Thus,
on a day-to-day basis, embarking on this extra-marital adventure, and continuing it, is
unquestionably the strategy of choice.  It is obvious that a “local” perspective – which assesses
the relative payoffs from the options day by day – dictates a “rational” decision to defect from
the relationship and indulge in an episode of infidelity.  Indeed, on each day, the choice is clear: 
The value of being unfaithful exceeds the value of maintaining exclusivity, and the payoff from
the affair dominates the payoff from fidelity.  As with the drug use example, “[]in local choice,
choosing the better option means choosing the item that currently has the higher value.”66  On
the fifth day of the sequence, for example, the value of an “unfaithful” day is 28, and of a faithful
day is 25.5, so being unfaithful is better.   Looking only at the payoff for that day, a rational
“local” decision-maker will elect to continue the liaison.  The same is true for every day.  Thus,
the “equilibrium” for a local choice perspective is to maintain the illicit relationship and cheat on
the spouse continuously.
Viewed from a global perspective, however, the choice set is radically different.   As
Table 2 and Figure 2 reveal, the “global” payoff – or total value to the choosing partner over a
30-day stretch – declines relentlessly as the number of illicit episodes increases.  Thus, a pattern
of four days of infidelity and 26 faithful days out of 30 yields a total payoff to the defecting
partner of 788 units, or an average of 26.3 per day.  In contrast, consistent fidelity over this
period yields 840 total units of value, with a daily average of 28.  Maintaining the secondary (or
illicit) liaison over the entire period generates a total benefit (listed at the bottom of the table) of
only 420 units, or an average of 14 per day, which is half the yield from consistent fidelity (listed
67  See, e.g., Mary Sinkewicz and Irwin Garfinkel, Unwed fathers’ ability to pay child
support: new estimates accounting for multiple partner fertility, 46 Demography (May 2009)
(finding in a large urban cohort that, for nearly 60% of unmarried couples with a new baby, one
or both of the parents also had a child by a previous partner.)  See also Andrew Cherlin, The
Marriage-go-round, at 95; and research cited in Amy Wax, Engines of Inequality, 41 Family
Law Quarterly at __.
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at the top).  Indeed, as with the drug example, complete “abstinence” – or refraining from extra-
curricular involvements altogether – is the globally rational strategy of choice.   From this
perspective, the watchword is “Just say no.”  
 The assumptions behind this model help explain what at first appears to be a
counterintuitive result: that it is better to stay the course than give in to temptation.   This is
especially jarring in light of the manifest attractions of the illicit dalliance.  Indeed, by definition,
the extracurricular relationship has a higher payoff each day than the primary relationship – else
the cheating partner would not be tempted to stray in the first place.  And, anyway, aren’t two
women better than one?  These intuitions only carry weight in the short term, however. 
Assessing the payoff for the entire time frame yields a contrary result.   
As with drug use, the contrast between local decisionmaking and global decisionmaking
in intimate relationships could not be more stark.  One says “Do it every day.”  The other
counsels “Never do.”  What explains the paradox?   The result depends on the assumption that
cheating will ordinarily have a negative effect on the value of the primary relationship: by
hypothesis, each episode of infidelity erodes the quality of the first partnership.  As the episodes
continue, the erosion will at first be gradual, but then may proceed at an accelerating pace as
growing complications strain the bond.  What complications might result?  The betrayed partner
will likely suffer from the distracted partner’s neglect or sense that something is amiss.  If an
affair is suspected or revealed (and because clandestine relationships are hard to maintain, most
likely it will eventually out), there will be jealousy, anger and recriminations, or even open
hostility.  In addition, such liaisons may – and in some quarters routinely do -- result in
pregnancy and the birth of one or more extra-marital children.67  These developments can
68    On the point that some liaisons do not follow this model, see discussion infra.  As for 
infidelity with multiple partners, these relationships represent variations on a theme, with the
strategy assumed to follow the same basic template as a single affair, or more so: the payoff from
each liaison begins as relatively high, but eventually starts to erode as it encroaches on existing
relationships.  Simultaneous relationships can be expected to have smaller absolute payoffs in
the short and long term, due to diminishing returns, greater complications, and the relative
paucity of time and attention As for repetitive serial monogamy, an alternative model of  failed
relationships that focuses on episodic switching rather than simultaneous liaisons is set out
below. See infra.
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seriously undermine the quality and emotional value of the initial relationship.  The model
assumes that these effects are incremental and build over time. 
But what of the value of the illicit relationship?  The model rests on the premise that
cheating offers a compelling temptation: in the short term, the value of taking a lover exceeds the
benefits of remaining faithful.  But the satisfactions of an illicit relationship are also dynamic
over time, and depend on the previous pattern of conduct.  The schedule in table 2 rests on a
prediction that the payoffs from cheating will also gradually slide.  Why assume this?  A
secondary love interest may be fun and sexually compelling, and can offer novelty,
companionship, and enjoyment.  But, in most cases, these novel pleasures will either gradually
decline or will be overbalanced by the downside costs.  The need to maintain secrecy and the
fear of the entanglement becoming known may start to chafe and take their toll.  If the primary
bond is simultaneously maintained (which this example assumes), it will be difficult for the love
interest to develop into a fully satisfying,  “serious” monogamous relationship.  There will be
little compensatory “upside” in deepening emotional ties, uninterrupted time together, and
shared activities and projects.  Also, the lover may put increasing pressure on the unfaithful
partner to abandon his or her primary relationship or, at the very least, to pay less attention to the
other partner.  All these vexations can undermine the benefits from an illicit affair.  To be sure,
not all secondary love interests will follow this pattern.  However, the evidence – which reveals
the fragility and short-lived nature of many of the liaisons within some sociodemographic groups
and the tensions caused by “cheating”– suggests that a significant number do.68  
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In sum, the decline in the value of the primary relationship, combined with the stresses
on the secondary liaison, creates a situation in which the global value of infidelity over the entire
30-day period is always less than remaining consistently faithful.  The model assumes that each
additional day of infidelity so undermines the value of the primary relationship for the cheating
partner that it is never worth cheating on that relationship even once.  The upside value of  the
illicit liaison – which also declines over time in this example – cannot compensate for this
deterioration in the value of the initial partnership.  
It is notable that the optimality of the global strategy does not depend on never
encountering an individual who is more attractive than one’s current partner, nor does it require
that the current relationship be more desirable than any rival opportunity that might appear on
the scene.  That the superiority of fidelity is not a matter of selecting the perfect partner is
fortunate, or else few people would marry or remain married!   Rather, success depends on
adopting a particular framework for decisionmaking:  thinking about one’s life as a whole  – that
is, considering consequences overall and in the longer term -- rather than focusing more
narrowly on immediate benefits.   Nonetheless, the reality is that sexual temptation is
everywhere.  The opportunity to choose between relatively desirable options does routinely
confront people from all sociodemographic groups who must navigate the world of interpersonal
relations.  None can avoid asking the question:  why stick with the present partner if something
better comes along?  Local thinking provides no good reason to stay the course.  Rather, local
choice dictates that the “rational” choice is to cheat.
In contrast, global choice provides a different answer.  The common thread that ties
together addiction and personal relationships is the corrosive effect of the immediately gratifying
choice on the alternatives to that choice.  It is critical to the explanatory power of this model, and
its ability to account for observed demographic patterns, that the relentless decline in the quality
of the primary relationship will not only reduce the total benefits of engaging in this strategy, but
will in many cases cause the primary relationship’s demise.  At some point, the cheating
69  See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market, Va. L. Rev. (1998). 
Indeed, the model is incomplete in not supplying the value of the payoffs to the betrayed partner,
which will of course affect the relationship’s dynamics.  The model implicitly indulges the
conceit that the value for each partner is similar and will vary in the same way depending on one
partner’s choices.  Even if the payoffs do not match precisely, it is probably safe to assume that
they are highly interdependent.    See discussion infra. 
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encouraged by local choice will so erode the benefits of the initial partnership to one or both
participants that it will no longer be worthwhile to stay together.  The relationship will break
down and the partners will go their separate ways.  That result does not necessarily follow
simply from the schedule of payoffs depicted.  Those payoffs do not in themselves reveal the
lower limit on what either party will tolerate, or when calling it quits will become the preferred
outcome.69  It does predict, however, that local choice will interfere with marriage primarily by
destabilizing relationships and hastening their pre-marital demise, or fostering the premature
break-up of marriages that do occur by increasing the incidence of divorce. 
In sum, the assumptions of this model operate to create the context in which individuals
confront the ongoing choice whether to maintain an exclusive relationship or to give in to the
temptation to be unfaithful.  The contrast between local and global choice reveals that the
“rational” strategy depends on the frame of reference.   For those who take the global view, a
relationship that looks attractive and compelling in the short run (and continues to be so) may
prove unwise overall.  In the end, the decision to be unfaithful will often make the decision-
maker worse off, and the best strategy is to eschew this choice altogether.  The global value
declines relentlessly because the thrill of the unfaithful episodes can never compensate for the
deterioration of the primary relationship.  In contrast, assuming that the primary relationship is
fundamentally sound, global value is maximized by sticking with the initial partner and staying
the course.  
Indeed, it can be anticipated that global thinking will often encourage individuals to
engage in behaviors that further enhance the payoffs from a global framework.  Partners who
apprehend and appreciate the benefits of successful long-term relationships may shape their
70  This paper restricts consideration to opposite sex relationships, and does not take on
the question of how homosexual partnerships might or might not differ.
71  See discussion infra and supra.
72  See, e.g., See, e.g., Judith Treas and Deirdre Giesen, “Sexual Infidelity among Married
and Cohabiting Americans, “ 62 J. Of Marriage and the Family (Feb. 2000) 48-60, 48 (“Virtually
all American couples, married or cohabiting, expect sexual exclusivity of one another . .
Couples’ agreements about sexual exclusivity are a contractual condition of their unions.”).  
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behavior to realize these advantages.   They may, for example, try harder to resolve differences
or achieve compromise.   These behavioral effects may compound the value of long-term
commitments.  The point is, however, that these benefits are only available if the participants
adopt a global perspective.  It is only on this view that resisting temptation becomes a rational
strategy.  And it is only if temptation is resisted that the long term benefits are forthcoming.
Is the analysis here plausible in light of what we know about the dynamics of ordinary
opposite-sex relationships?70  Although the model builds in some simplifying assumptions that
may not be universally valid,71 it nonetheless comports with common sense and predicts what we
see.  A critical assumption is that infidelity undermines existing relationships.  In fact free love
has not yet proved workable and non-exclusive sexual liaisons tend to be unstable.  Despite a
dramatic evolution of sexual mores over the past 50 years, norms regarding sexual fidelity have
remained remarkably durable over time.  Sexual exclusivity remains a central aspect of serious
sexual relationships, with most people expecting and demanding it as a condition of romantic
partnership.72  In light of this, fidelity or a pledge of fidelity is probably a prerequisite to
marriage and critical to marital longevity.  These goals are seriously compromised by a myopic,
local perspective on relationships.  
In contrast to the posited corrosive effects of infidelity on the primary relationship, the
assumption that prolonged infidelity will erode the value of the illicit relationship may strike
some as more dubious.  The example assumes that the secondary relationship will decline in
value over time, in part because of a lover’s escalating demands or the limitations inherent in
39
carrying on two relationships.  But this may not always be the case.  The value of the alternative
relationship need not decline, and may even improve somewhat with time.  One or both lovers
may not be seeking a deep and intense emotional bond, and the absence of such entanglements
may be viewed as a positive benefit.  
Alternatively, an affair may proceed from grand passion and flower into a durable long-
term partnership, superior in every way to the one it replaced.  Or lovers may invest deeply in
their relationship or fall genuinely in love, which greatly enhances its value.  In those cases, the
liaison may be worth embarking upon and continuing  regardless of whether the primary
relationship deteriorates to the point of a break up.  That is, even a global perspective would
appear to counsel divorce and remarriage.  Indeed, these scenarios generate a not unfamiliar
phenomenon:  the one-time serial monogamist, who forsakes a poor match for a better one.  By
hypothesis, however, this variation does not issue in an endless series of new entanglements and
break-ups.  The switch will presumably be a one-off as the new relationship now takes on the
characteristics of the primary partnership in our example: global decisionmaking should by
rights inure it to the routine temptations the inevitably arise.  Thus, although global thinkers are
not wholly immune from lapses or failed relationships, those failures will not necessarily repeat
themselves or become a way of life.  Moreover, the model assumes that most affairs will be the
product of local thinking, which will not produce stability in the long run.  Thus affairs that
produce stable second marriage will be atypical. 
As noted, the model also rests on the assumption that infidelity ordinarily erodes the
value of the cheated-on relationship to the point of collapse.  But the prediction that the initial
partnership will inevitably suffer need not always be valid.  It is possible to imagine a liaison
with a very different structure of payoffs – one that would stabilize in a long-running extra-
marital affair.  The primary relationship may not deteriorate much or at all, because the affair
remains a secret, or the betrayed spouse accepts it.  Alternatively, the relationship deteriorates,
but not to the “breaking point,” which allows the unfaithful spouse to continue cheating without
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destroying the initial partnership.  The secondary relationship may improve in value enough,
and/or the primary relationship suffer so little erosion, as to make some degree of infidelity
optimal even on a global calculus.  In all these cases, the pattern of payoffs, or the consequences
for the initial relationship, will clearly differ from those depicted in our example.  But, once
again, it is assumed that such a scenario will be exceptional.
 In sum, the assumptions of this stylized model will not apply in all cases, and the
predicted outcomes admit of exceptions.  Not all  “local choice” scenarios will issue in the
repeated failure to form or maintain stable monogamous relationships, nor will all two-timing
prove undesirable or destabilizing from a global choice perspective.  The prediction here is not
all of nothing, but rather more or less.  Local thinking will tend to lead to relatively high levels
of relationship instability, and a global approach will, on balance, generate significantly more
stability.  
Indeed, further examples below show, these predictions will hold good within a fairly
wide range of conditions, with considerable variations on the theme possible.  For example, a
decline in the value of the secondary relationship is not essential.   As Tables 3 & 4, and Figures
3 & 4 illustrate, even if the secondary relationship plateaus or improves over the course of a
liaison, avoiding illicit involvements can still be globally optimal in many cases, so long as the
value of the primary relationship is significantly undermined by infidelity.   In Figure 3 (which
depicts the values in Table 3), the secondary relationship holds its value better, declining from
30 daily units of satisfaction to 18.  As in Figure 2, the illicit partner remains comparatively
more attractive than the initial partner as the relationship continues, but the gulf is even larger
than for Figure 2.  Nonetheless, the global equilibrium remains the same.  Likewise, in Figure 4
(corresponding to the values in Table 4), the illicit relationship stabilizes and then improves as it
proceeds, with a final daily payoff of 21 units.  Once again, the global equilibrium is unchanged. 
Indeed, on a wide range of initial assumptions, the global point of view yields the same lesson:
don’t do it.  That is because the benefits of the illicit relationship will fail to compensate for its
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corrosive effect on the primary relationship, and thus the global payoff from infidelity will fall
short of the equilibrium value of fidelity.  Global thinkers will eschew infidelity over a
substantial range of conditions. 
b.  Switching partners: the decision to stay or go
The scenarios examined so far posit an initial relationship of variable duration – either
one that has recently formed or that has been ongoing for some time.  In response to the
possibility of sexual infidelity, one partner confronts the choice of whether to cheat on the
relationship or not.  Either the partner remains faithful, or he embarks on two simultaneous
relationships.  But carrying on two relationships at once is not the only possible response in this
situation.  Instead of two-timing the initial partner, a person could instead decide to abandon that
partner for another.  In playing out the options represented by this scenario, the choice is
between sticking with the original partner, or switching to a new partner.  Which of these
strategies represents the “rational” strategy in turn implicates the contrast between local and
global choice.  
 In this scenario, an individual is assumed to meet an attractive person and start a
relationship.  After some period of cultivating the relationship, the person encounters another
potential partner who seems more attractive at the moment.  He or she must then make a decision
whether to “switch” – that is, abandon his initial partner and start a new relationship – or stick
with his initial partner.  Will the individual succumb to the new person’s charms and abandon
the first partner?  
A possible payoff structure informing this choice is reflected in the Tables 5 & 6.  Table
5 (and Figure 5) depicts stylized daily payoffs from a relationship over the first half of a 30-day
period.  The payoff at day 1 is 26.  The relationship has its ups and down as the partners get to
know each other, but it eventually improves and stabilizes at a daily (local) value of 38, or total
(global) relationship-specific payoff for the entire period of 459, on day 15.  Now consider Table
6 (and Figure 6).  Assume another potential partner comes along a few days after the
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commencement of the first relationship.  That partner seems more attractive, as reflected in an
initial (local) value of 27.  That value exceeds the coincident value of the relationship with the
first partner (25).  A person who “thinks locally” will jump ship and switch to the new partner,
because the payoff that day is greater than from the original partner.  But a person who is
thinking globally about present and future payoffs during entire period will make a different
decision.  Having already invested in the first relationship and anticipating that its value will
increase and eventually stabilize (but only if the relationship remains exclusive), the global
thinker will stay the course.  Comparisons of the schedules in Tables 5 & 6 (and Figures 5,  6,
and 6A) illustrate that someone who remains faithful can expect a greater overall, and thus
average, payoff for the entire15 day period by staying with the first partner rather than switching
to the second.  If a person stays with the initial relationship for 15 days, he can expect to achieve
a stable partnership value of 38, with a total payoff from this period of 459 and an average daily
payoff of 30.6.   But if he embarks on a new relationship four days into this period, and that
liaison follows the usual stylized pattern (initially wavering as partners work out the kinks, then
stabilizing and starting to grow in value), the partnership will achieve a total daily value of 34 at
the end of the initial 15-day period, with a total payoff during that period of 423, averaging 28.2
units per day.  That is significantly less than the payoffs from the initial partnership if continued
for the entire period.  Thus, even assuming the alternative partner is consistently more attractive
locally than the person she replaces, a global calculus reveals that staying with the first partner is
the value-maximizing strategy.  See Figures 6 and 6A (depicting the global average payoff from
switching partners  vs. staying with partner #1)
This exercise assesses the global value of switching partners midstream from the start of
the first relationship.  But why not reset the clock again upon meeting a new partner, on the
assumption that the relationship with the more attractive person will follow a trajectory similar to
that anticipated with the first?  Indeed, since the new relationship commences from a better
starting point, won’t it accumulate more value over a similar interval?  As Table 7and Figure 7
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illustrate, projecting ahead 15 days from the initiation of the second relationship could be
expected to generate more benefits than a similar period for the first relationship, with the same
trend presumably continuing for 30 days and beyond.  Thus, the decision to switch partners
would appear to make sense not only on a local choice frame, but also from a global point of
view. 
This appearance is misleading. First, starting from square one fails to take account of the
investments made in the first relationship.  Starting the talley over from the beginning of each
new relationship fails to capture the lost value of the partnerships (or partnerships) left behind. 
But the more serious problem with the “new day” scenario is that it is inherently unstable.  On
this view, a rational actor will abandon the second relationship immediately if someone more
attractive comes along who promises immediate (and, on the “new day” assumption, long-term)
payoffs greater than the first partnership.  And such prospects can be expected to appear with
regularity.   The arrival on the scene of each prospect will cause the protagonist to jump ship,
generating a series of scenarios like the one described above.  But this creates an infinite regress:
because each relationship is vulnerable to the same calculus, each will not be the last.  A pattern
of chronic instability is the result.   (It is interesting to note, however, that resisting temptation
and staying with the original partner for a longer period would, as often as not, reduce the
incentive to switch, as that partner’s local value will eventually exceed the payoff from the
hypothetical new partner.  But local thinking all but obviates such a development.)
This stylized example assumes that many opposite sex relationships will grow more
valuable with time, and that rewards from exclusivity will often take time to accrue.  (In contrast
the “two-timing” model in the previous section does not rest on the premise that long-term
partnerships steadily improve: it only assumes that infidelity will undermine a competing
relationship.)   Both examples assume, however, that the virtues of fidelity are hard for some to
apprehend, and temptation is everywhere.  By switching partners, a person never realizes the
benefits of an enduring bond nor reaps the long-term rewards of stable family life.  Of course, as
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already noted, not all relationships follow this trajectory and not all deliver rewards in the long
term.  Some are beyond salvage, turn irretrievably sour, or lose their value altogether.  There
may sometimes be good reasons, on any “rational” view, to leave a partner or abandon one
relationship for another.  The premise here, however, is that those cases are the exception rather
than the rule.  Assuming a reasonably successful match, the functional default for global thinkers
is staying with what you have.  The point is that local thinking can disrupt relationships that,
even if far from ideal, might prove viable in the long term and ultimately yield substantial
rewards. 
C.  Explaining changes in family structure: Does the model fit?
A difference in the propensity to make local or global choices in the personal sphere goes
a long way towards accounting for the dispersion in demographic patterns.   As noted, significant
disparities have emerged by race and social class in patterns of family formation and stability. 
Transient or short-lived liaisons, sometimes involving periods of cohabitation but infrequently
resulting in marriage, are rapidly becoming the norm in for less educated cohorts and already
dominate in the black community.  Out-of-wedlock birth rates are significantly more common in
these demographic groups, and their marriage break up more often.  In contrast, persons with
more education, and especially white college graduates, still marry at very high rates.  Their risk
of divorce has declined significantly since the 1980s and they rarely have children outside of
marriage.
By leading people to take advantage of new and seemingly better opportunities, local
choice generates a pattern of infidelity, short-lived liaisons, and fragile partnerships.  These in
turn interfere with the development of enduring long term bonds and undermine the prospects for
stable marriages.  The expected results would include lower marriage rates, a rise in short-term
cohabitation, more multiple partner fertility, higher numbers of extra-marital births, and children
growing up in fatherless families.  And these patterns are in fact seen more often in some
demographic groups than in others.  
73  See discussion at — supra. 
74  See, e.g., Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Random Family: Love, Drugs, Trouble and Coming
of Age in the Bronx.
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In contrast, global thinking can be expected to lead to less cheating on current
relationships – or a greater propensity to exercise care and discretion in doing so – so as not to
jeopardize existing partnerships.  These tendencies can be expected to foster successful long-
term relationships, stable marriages, traditional nuclear families, and low rates of multi-partner
fertility and extra-marital births.  These patterns are in fact observed among more educated and
affluent members of the population.
One potential limitation of this model is that, by contrasting local and global
decisionmaking about sexual conduct, it focuses on only one aspect of behavior.  But sexual
infidelity is not the only factor that determines whether a relationship endures.  A range of
behaviors surely come into play.  Do habits of thought and action about other aspects of personal
relationships vary by sociodemographic group?   
The ethnographic work of Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas is revealing in this regard. 
As already noted,73 the single mothers the authors interview complain most consistently about
their male partners’ infidelity, which often leads to the birth of children outside the relationship. 
But infidelity is only one factor impeding the formation of lasting unions.  The women also
describe a range of other shortcomings, including poor impulse control, violence, financial
profligacy, drug use, and poor work effort.  These women’s observations strongly suggest that
their failure to marry, despite a professed desire to do so, is a function of their men’s anti-social
behavior – what Edin and Kefalas dub the “crummy boyfriend” problem.  
This study, and other portraits of low income families,74 suggest that unstable
relationships in disadvantaged populations are linked to anti-social behaviors in many
dimensions.  It can be argued that what makes boyfriends crummy is a tendency to think locally. 
The decision to engage in many of the complained-of behaviors would appear to involve a
75  See, e.g., Stephanie Ventura, Joyce Abma, William Mosher, and Stanley Henshaw,
Estimate Pregnancy Rates by Outcome for the United States, 1990-2004, National Vital
Statistics Reports, Volume 56, #15 (April 14, 2008),  National Center for Health Statistics.  On
class gradients in extra-marital pregnancies see, Robert D. Plotnick, Seven Decades of Non-
Marital Childbearing in the United States (2004), unpublished ms. on file with author, at 12
(Showing that education correlates with extra-marital pregnancy rates and that “ [m]other’s and
father’s education are strongly and inversely associated with their daughter’s likelihood of
nonmarital childbearing.”).  Robert D. Plotnick, The Effects of Attitudes on Teenage Premarital
Pregnancy and its Resolution, 57 American Sociological Review (1992) 800-811, 803 (“ Family
background characteristics are significantly associated with premarital pregnancy and its
resolution.”); Brent C. Miller and Kristin A. Moore, “Adolescent Sexual Behavior, Pregnancy,
and Parenting Research through the 1980s), 52 J. Of Marriage and the Family (1990), 1025-
1044, 1028 (noting that girls from married two parent families, ,and with more educated parents,
are less likely to be sexually active).   See also Hofferth, Sandra and Cheryl Hayes, eds. 1987.
Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy and Childbearing, Vol. 2. (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press) (noting class differentials in incidence and resolution of
adolescent pregnancy).
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tradeoff between satisfying immediate desires and securing long-term benefits.  The choices may
minimize costs in the short run, but often wreak destruction in the long run.  
Likewise, many of the woman in this study make decisions that undermine their ability to
maintain long-term relationships with men, and otherwise compromise their economic position. 
Although having a child out of wedlock yields immediate benefits, it erodes future
marriageability and creates obstacles to harmonious relationships with men who are not the
child’s father.  Becoming a single parent also seriously interferes with work and education, and
saddles a woman with onerous responsibilities that are difficult to bear alone.  
One key behavior that affects reproductive patterns is the effective use of contraception. 
Although the failure to use birth control may not directly undermine relationship stability,
conscientious contraception is critical to reducing out of wedlock childbearing.   The evidence
suggests that differential patterns of contraceptive use, with resulting variations in rates of extra-
marital pregnancy, are an important component of observed race and class differentials in extra-
marital childbearing.   These patterns in turn drive the incidence of abortion, with high observed
rates of terminations among minority and low income teens and adult women.75  Birth control
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use is one of a cluster of behaviors that can be subject to local or global patterns of choice. 
Because effective contraception  requires anticipating the long-term costs of unprotected sex,
groups that think globally can be expected to use control fertility more effectively and
conscientiously, and those that think locally less so.  
Nonetheless, group differences in effective contraception and use of abortion cannot be
the whole story.   It is still the case that most women want children and the vast majority of
women will have children at some point in their reproductive lives.  The key question is when
and in what context those children will be born and raised.  But that is a function of whether their
mothers are married or unmarried, which in turn depends on the formation of stable and cohesive
relationships.  Where such relationships are in short supply, many more children will be born
and grow up in fatherless families.
In sum, men and women in groups with low marriage rates are observed to adopt
strategies that promise short term rewards rather than benefits that unfold slowly over time. 
Those strategies may also foreclose beneficial options down the road.  In contrast, the traits that
make men and women good marriage partners are most likely associated with the restraint and
long-term planning that require a global perspective.   This analysis suggests that the model of
sexual choice proposed here is a good proxy for a broader array of behaviors conducive to
enduring partnerships.
Another possible shortcoming of this model is that it focuses too narrowly on thinking
styles.  The behaviors that impede relationship stability appear to reflect dysfunctions in both
thought and action.  Thinking globally is not enough.  To be sure, adopting a global perspective
is an important element.  A person must be able to view life as a whole and project into the
future.   He must notice and assign value to future consequences.  He must be able to anticipate
the potential benefits from maintaining a long-term relationship, but also the eventual
consequences of failing to do so.  Specifically, he must somehow appreciate that the choice to
cheat on an existing partner, although promising immediate pleasures, will progressively erode
76  See discussion of empirical work on executive control, time discounting, and other
attributes, infra.
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that relationship, and then factor this understanding into his calculations.   But failure to adopt a
global perspective is not purely a cognitive problem; one must also be able to act on these
realizations.  This requires the development of the habits of mind and heart that enable people to
refrain from behaviors that interfere with long-term goals, and to pursue those that promote
them.   A person must possess the necessary abilities and inclinations, including the restraint and
self-control to make good on their perceptions. 
In sum, to get and stay married, a person must anticipate the long term rewards and
consequences of personal relationships, resist short-term temptations, and guide behavior to
realize those rewards.  What determines whether someone succeeds in doing this?  A host of
factors surely come into play, affecting both cognition and conduct.   Individual characteristics
are doubtless important, with attributes like IQ, risk aversion, personal discount rate,
intertemporal preferences, ability to defer gratification, conscientiousness, impulsiveness, self-
control, and executive functioning, affecting the tendency to engage in global or local modes of
decisionmaking.   
Does this model take these attributes into account?  One way to take account of personal
discount rates is to vary the values individuals assign to remote as compared to immediate
rewards.  Because this framework does not assign distinct payoffs to different individuals or
lower values for remote rewards, it does not directly incorporate individual discount rates. 
Nonetheless, the model takes this factor into account indirectly:  the choice between local and
global thinking reflects the ability and willingness to assign weight to distant payoffs in making
immediate decisions and to think of one’s life as a whole.  Hence, high discount rates can be
expected to fuel local thinking, and low discount rates to facilitate global choice.  Likewise with
risk profiles: risk averse people will find it easier to think globally, whereas risk seekers are
more likely to think locally.76 
77  Ibid.
78  Heyman at 161-162
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D.  Moral deregulation and local vs. global choice: the demise of “simple rules for simple
people”
Although individual endowments and propensities are important, they cannot be the
whole story.  Despite exemplifying a range individual characteristics, most people behaved
differently (and more uniformly) 50 years ago.  Dramatic changes in marital and reproductive
behavior over time suggest that other factors loom large.  The contention here is that the
evolution of social norms and the weakening of institutional structures over the past 50 years
have changed the way people think about their conduct in the personal and sexual sphere. 
Although norm changes may influence individual characteristics that bear on choice (by, for
example, shaping childrearing practices or other aspects of individual development), they also
exert an independent influence on the decisionmaking process.              
In support of his assertion that social norms and personal values affect drug addiction and
recovery, Heyman notes that drug use soared as the stigma attached to drugs declined in the
1960s.   Nonetheless, patterns of addiction were not uniform.  Whether Vietnam veterans who
had used heroin in wartime continued to use drugs postwar was observed to vary with the
dominant norms of the communities to which they returned.  From his investigations, Gene
Heyman concludes that the expectations created by prevailing social norms – including “ideas,
values and attitudes” that “depend on social traditions”--  exert a powerful influence.  Individuals
who recover from addiction or decide to give up drugs repeatedly cite their desire to live up to
role responsibilities and fulfill social expectations as critical to their decisions.  They express a
sense of shame and self-disgust at falling short of dominant standards and point to their deep
regret at disappointing those around them.77  In sum, they rely on “socially transmitted
proscriptions” that set limits on behavior, and on “social roles, ideals, and shared understandings
that emphasize restraint.”78 
79  Kay Hymowitz, Marriage and Caste in America, at 9, 29.
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What lessons do these observations hold for encouraging the adoption of a global
perspective on personal relationships?  What conditions tend to foster the habits of restraint,
compromise, and mutual problem solving that make for harmonious relationships, and enhance
the prospects for stable marriage?  The propensity to think globally about intimate relationships,
and to act on those thoughts, may critically depend on what Kay Hymowitz calls “reproductive
life scripts,” which prescribe guidelines for the most desirable course of behavior over a
lifetime.79  Where do such scripts come from?  The high rates of marriage in past decades, when
dominant mores channeled reproduction into that context, suggest an underappreciated role for
embodying behavioral guidelines in traditional institutions.  Indeed, the universal expectation of
marriage would appear to operate as a heuristic on more than one level.  Marriage sets out well-
defined roles and embodies prevailing expectations.  A strong marriage norm shapes the habits
of mind necessary to live up to its prescriptions, while also reducing the need for individuals to
perform the complicated calculations necessary to chart their own course.  To be sure, the
success of social mores in shaping behavior will vary depending on circumstances, individual
characteristics, and group culture.  Nonetheless, by replacing a sophisticated exercise with
simple prudential rules, a strong expectation of marriage will make it easier – and easier than in a
laissez faire environment – for individuals to muster the restraint necessary to act on long-term
thinking.   In short, the conventions and customs surrounding marriage are designed to bridge the
gap between aspirations and the mundane steps necessary to achieve them.  
This analysis reveals why preserving a “marriage culture” is not just a matter of
ideological commitment.  Its most important effects are in encouraging the daily habits of
thought and action that foster lasting relationships.  Strong marriage norms help guide and shape
decisions that lead to optimal choices.  And the institutionalization of marriage may reinforce
itself in other ways.  Marriage influences child-rearing practices and provides a setting in which
children grow up.  There is evidence that the familiar hallmarks of effective socialization (such
80  See Amy Wax, Engines of Inequality, supra.
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as restraint, moderation, emotional control, trustworthiness, persistence, and sobriety) are best
developed when children live with their biological parents within stable marital homes.80   These
attributes, in turn, make it easier to think globally and maintain stable personal relationships.  By
strengthening the structure – the traditional nuclear family– that helps foster these attributes,
marriage builds on itself.  In addition, it may be easier for persons who have grown up in
conventional families to reproduce them.  Without exposure to successful long term
relationships, thinking globally does not come naturally. 
There is no doubt that the sexual revolution has weakened marriage.  The prescriptive
culture of marriage has gradually been supplanted by the rise of an individualism that invites
people to make immediate tradeoffs and to look to personal desires to guide sexual and
reproductive choice.   Instead of  “nudging” people towards the results favored by such a
perspective, a norm of individualism leaves people to satisfy their own immediate preferences. 
In the absence of strong prescriptions, people faced with a menu of options from which they
must choose engage in a personal calculus of choice.   This leads some to the default of local
choice.
Does the rise of individualism and the deinstitutionalization of marriage help explain
observed sociodemographic patterns?  One question is why well-educated cohorts – which tend
to embrace the culturally dominant individualistic view of sexual mores – still marry and stay
married at relatively high rates.  Why have their ideological commitments not translated into
weaker or more transient relationships?  Likewise, why has the sexual revolution had more
pronounced – and destructive – effects on the less educated and minorities?  In sum, the question
remains as to why some segments of society still maintain stable and enduring relationships – the
pattern that was more pervasive in the past – whereas others do not.   
 The analysis here suggests that these developments are best understood as the product of
moral deregulation.  The rise of individualism in the wake of sexual liberation weakened the
81  See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World
82  See Alice Ristroph and Melissa E. Murray, Disestablishing the Family, UC Berkeley
Public Law Research Paper No. 1567867, forthcoming Yale Law Journal (2010).  For
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moral and institutional conventions that dominated before the 1960s.  The sexual mores
embodied in these conventions were designed to guide most people to stable choices.  By
establishing “simple rules for simple people” – in the form of clear, transparent, and authoritative
expectations – these strictures functioned not so much by encouraging global thinking as such,
but by obviating the need to think, or to think very much, about family formation and sexual
choice.   Rather, all that was necessary was to follow the script, and the script was simple. 
Traditional norms thus reduced the ambit for the exercise of individual judgment, which in turn
placed less of a burden on the deliberative capacities and will of ordinary individuals.81  
To be sure, these expectations were enforced by a complex of formal and informal
sanctions.  The stigma attached to non-marriage, divorce, and out of wedlock childbearing were
far greater 50 years ago than now, and deviations from expected behaviors were more costly.  
Some of those sanctions were concrete, but others were grounded in social disapproval. 
Deviations from expectations viewed as irresponsible, unacceptable, undesirable, socially
destructive, and – well – deviant.  In addition, many of these norms were internalized through
inculcation, moral education, and pervasive reinforcement.  But the hypothesis here is that norms
did not function solely through sanction or through internalized prescription backed by cultural
authority.  They also functioned as effective heuristics.  Clear, easy to follow guidelines relieved
people of the need to choose among a broad a range of options by engaging in a complex
predictive exercise.  The decision to get married, for example, did not require above-average
foresight, extra-ordinary self-control, or the ability to project alternative scenarios.  It only
required doing what was generally expected and steering clear of alternatives.          
In the wake of the upheavals of the sexual revolution, however, there is now no script to
follow.   The deregulation, or “disestablishment,” of traditional family forms, 82 and the demise
exploration of the adverse consequences of the legal and social deregulation of sexual conduct
and the family see, e.g., Brenda Almond, The Fragmenting Family (Oxford 2006); David L.
Tubbs, Freedom’s Orphans, Contemporary Liberalism and the Fate of American Children
(Princeton 2007); Jane Lewis, The End of Marriage?  Individualism and Intimate Relations,
(Edward Elgar 2001).
83  See discussion, supra.
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of a widely accepted code of conduct, throws people back on their own devices.  Confronted
with a plethora of  “acceptable” options, life plans, and “lifestyles,” each person must navigate
an intricate landscape of personal and sexual choice unguided by authoritative rules.  As
individuals bear the onus of self-regulation, the result is a regime of every man for himself.  
Individuals are left to draw on their own inclinations and shape their own habits.  Taking a
global approach is one option, but local decisionmaking may be the path of least resistance. 
Self-imposed moderation may prove elusive.
The evidence suggests that, when it comes to personal relationships, the propensity to
think globally or locally is not evenly distributed across the population.  Rather there appear to
be systematic differences in recourse to these strategies.  Global choice seems to dominate in
some sociodemographic groups, and local choice in others.  What accounts for the
discrepancies?  One possibility is that more educated and advantaged individuals are by and
large better equipped to do for themselves what strong institutional and normative expectations
used to do for everyone. Because privileged cohorts are more likely to engage in global thinking,
they will have a less volatile response to the moral deregulation of the sexual revolution.  
Affluence and education are now highly correlated.  But obtaining an advanced education
requires certain cognitive and personal attributes.  The ability to think long term, to anticipate
consequences, and to project complex scenarios are needed to succeed in school.  Likewise, self-
control and the ability to act on prudential insights are also valuable.  Higher education both
requires these capacities, and fosters them.  Education, in turn, is an important ticket to well-
paying jobs,83 which often draw on similar attributes.  Although education helps cultivate these
84   On marriage rates, see supra.  On education completion, see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of
Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2007, and
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2007
85  See further discussion below.
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capacities, selection effects are also at work:  more intelligent and better socialized people find it
easier to think ahead and to exercise the restraint needed to succeed in multiple spheres of life,
including the personal, educational, and professional.  They are probably also more adept at
compromise and mutual problem-solving, which are also essential for harmonious relationships. 
In sum, if left to self-regulate, better organized people can be expected more often to achieve
more orderly intimate relationships and a better organized family life.  It is therefore not
surprising that well-educated whites and Asians disproportionately benefit from the educational
route to affluence, and are also the most married groups in society today. 
Family composition and marital behavior do not just differ by class, however.  These
patterns also dramatically differ by race.   Disparities by race (as well as class) in sexual
behavior and relationship stability have existed for some time, but have until recently been
relatively small.  The patterns have diverged more widely over the past fifty years.  Income and
schooling account for some of the disparity (as blacks tend to be poorer and less educated than
their white and Asian counterparts), but not for most:  even after controlling for these factors,
racial and ethnic differences are substantial and continue to widen.84  One possibility is that
blacks are more vulnerable to moral deregulation, and more likely to think locally about personal
relationships.  Background cultural norms no doubt play a role, with reactions to the rise of
individualism and the loosening of sexual restrictions reflecting group attitudes and attributes
that are poorly understood.  The source of these observed differences, whether grounded in
culture, or individual characteristics, warrants further investigation.85 
In short, this analysis suggests that the decline in the enforcement of a uniform code of
sexual morality, both formal and informal, has enshrined individual choice as the dominant
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principle in intimate relations.  The ethos of sexual liberation and autonomy, the celebration of
individualism and self-determination, the virtual disappearance of collectively enforced stigma,
the decline of strong norms of behavior, and the fading of an expectation of conformity to roles
within established institutions, have all contributed to the demise of conventions that effectively
compensated for many people’s inability to make optimal choices.  Although advanced
education, and the personal endowments that enhance its advantages, still help the privileged
manage these challenges, those who are less well endowed are also less able to self-regulate. 
“Natural” inequalities now dominate over the leveling influence of moral precepts designed to
keep everyone’s behavior in check.   On this view, the sexual strictures that have eroded
significantly in the past 50 years were highly paternalistic: they enforced a set of life-course
decisions that many people were too weak to enforce for themselves.  Whereas expectations as
well as behavior used to be uniform across society, the dominant practices of more privileged
cohorts now no longer “trickle down” to less well-off or vulnerable minority populations. 
Simple precepts – get married, stay faithful – have been supplanted by individual, case by case
judgments.  Bright line rules have given way to a process of ad hoc, moral improvisation that is
vulnerable to being hijacked by local thinking.  It is not surprising that growing numbers of
people are succumbing to this perspective.  It is also not surprising that the resulting behaviors
lead to social harms.  Until recently, sexual behavior in western society was highly moralized. 
Morality is necessary, and moral rules tend to arise, where self-regarding behavior comes into
conflict with the interests of others or society as a whole.  Sex poses just such a danger of 
“negative externalities,” and  sexual morality is designed to reign in and restrain such potentially
harmful impulses.   Relaxing clear rules of sexual conduct, and putting people in charge of their
own decisions, is thus likely to increase the incidence of self-regarding conduct, with people
tempted to cheat, succumb to short term attraction, and to be a judge in their own case.  In sum,
86  See, e.g., Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational (suggesting that the demise of strict
benchmarks for professional conduct in law and business, and the replacement of bright line
precepts by individualized, flexible, and ‘context” dependent” guidelines, encouraged self-
serving conduct and cheating).
87  See, e.g., England, Paula, Emily Fitzgibbons Shafer, and Alison C. K. Fogarty, 
Hooking up and forming romantic relationships on today’s college campuses, in The Gendered
Society Reader, 3rd ed., edited by Michael Kimmel and Amy Aronson (2008) 531-46.
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relaxing moral rules will lead to more negative externalities and more social harms.86
Related cultural trends help fuel these developments.  Individualism promotes an ethos of
non-judgmentalism, in which sexual life belongs to the realm of personal autonomy and
discretion.  This favors a laissez faire regime in which sexual conduct is a private matter that
should not be judged by others and is none of anyone’s business.  Indeed, the evidence is
overwhelming that sexual freedom – and sexual activity -- has increased throughout society over
past decades.  The taboo against premarital sex has disappeared almost entirely, with free-
wheeling sexual activity for the unmarried commonplace throughout society, including on
college campuses.87  The data indicate, however, that the consequences of these patterns vary
widely.  Once college graduates arrive at the altar (and most do, albeit at older ages than in the
past), sexual experimentation wanes.  Declining divorce rates suggest that most people in this
cohort settle down.  And premarital relations almost never lead to out-of-wedlock childbearing in
this group.   In short, the demographic picture suggests that college graduates – especially non-
minorities – have achieved an relatively settled equilibrium through self-imposed moderation. 
They practice a sexually liberated lifestyle, but only up to a point.  For the long-haul, most settle
into a sustained pattern of marital monogamy.
Despite their different lifestyle, however, elites appear hesitant to espouse a conventional
code of conduct to the less privileged, perhaps because they are concerned to preserve their own
88  The stance of today’s educated class recalls Sigmund Freud’s famous assertion, in a
letter to the eminent American neurologist James J. Putnam, that although he stood for a greater
sexual freedom than bourgeois society thought proper, he himself had taken relatively little
advantage of it.   See Peter Gay, Reading Freud: explorations and entertainments, at 166 (Yale). 
Clearly elites today take advantage of sexual freedom, but only up to a point.
89  On the dynamics of norm change see, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 Columbia L. Review 903 (1996).
90  See Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Jeremy Greenwood, and Nezih Guner, “From Shame
to Game in One Hundred years: An Economic Model of the Rise in Premarital Sex and its De-
Stigmatization,” Population Studies Center Working Paper Series, 2010. 
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sexual prerogatives and reluctant to endorse constraints that are not self-imposed.88  The
celebration of family diversity and the taboo surrounding candid discussions of racial and class
differences in intimate conduct also discourage moral prescription or a searching inquiry into the
cultural or personal sources of observed disparities.  Finally, the well-educated and well-heeled
may simply lack comprehension of the habits of mind that allow them to achieve family stability. 
They may be only dimly aware of why their relationships are more successful and sustained. 
In the same vein, groups with more volatile family relations may not fully comprehend
the causes and sources of their current situation.  Indeed, the situation will be opaque because it
is complex.  Local thinking will not be the only force that drives the segmentation of practices in
reproduction and family life.  As the incidence of non-marriage and single parent families within
more vulnerable groups increases, group dynamics, such as tipping and contagion, may add to
the effect of local thinking by accelerating the pace of these behaviors.89   As these patterns
become more dominant, they will in turn be considered more acceptable.   Thus, the poor
decisionmaking that will take over in the wake of moral deregulation will fuel a new set of
norms.  The resulting norm changes may further entrench these behaviors, making them more
difficult to reverse.  
An interesting recent paper serves as supplement to this theory by offering an economic
perspective on emerging class differences in sexual mores.90  In an attempt to explain the class
91  See Akerlof, Yellin, and Katz, supra.
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gradient in out of wedlock childbearing, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and colleagues attempt to
built on the “birth control shock” theory of Akerlof, et al,91 which traces the rise in out of
wedlock childbearing to norm shifts engendered by more effective contraception.  These authors
attribute widening class disparities to differential incentives for parental investment in the
socialization of offspring towards norms of sexual restraint.  Before effective methods of birth
control became widely available in the 1960s, extra-marital sex posed a high risk of out of
wedlock pregnancy.  The costs of these births were borne by religious institutions, the
government, and families.  As a result, the government and the church invested heavily in
supporting and enforcing norms of sexual continence.  The authors posit that, in the wake of the
contraceptive revolution, the risks of pregnancy for those targeted by norm enforcement –
mainly women of childbearing age – were perceived as dramatically reduced.  Policing of sexual
norms became more “expensive,” so investments in norm enforcement declined.  Specifically,
church practice and legal restrictions were liberalized, thus “privatizing” regulation to families. 
Paradoxically, however, and in keeping with the predictions of the Akerlof model, contraception
encouraged sexual activity, which increased the number of out of wedlock births – a trend that
has disproportionately affected the less affluent.  The challenge is to explain this gradient.  The
authors posit that disparities in opportunity costs from extra-marital pregnancy differed by class,
with the costs of premarital sex “lower for women stuck at the bottom of the social economic
scale.”  These differentials affected parental incentives to inculcate sexual restraint.  Upper class
children had more to lose, and so were more intensively socialized to avoid extra-marital
pregnancy.  Persons with fewer resources stood to sacrifice less, and so relaxed their
enforcement. 
This account is not without flaws.  First, although the analysis purports to consider the
economic costs of extra-marital pregnancy, including lower chances for upward mobility, it
slights the fact that absolute losses may not be as important as effects on the margin.  The
92  See below at – (citing data that rates of sexual activity as well as rates of pregnancy
conditioned on sexual activity among young women differ by class and race.)  
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marginal utility of forgone income for less well off women would seem to be greater than for the
more privileged.  This is especially so in light of the effect of out-of-wedlock children on a
woman’s chance to marry,  since marriage has the potential significantly to improve a woman’s
economic position even for the less educated.  Second, the authors also fail to address why rates
of out of wedlock childbearing are so much higher for blacks, with even well-educated blacks
having extra-marital birth rates far in excess of similarly educated whites.  Third, despite making
sexual restraint norms harder to enforce by lowering the risk of pregnancy per sexual encounter,
the availability of effective contraception nonetheless taxed the resources of churches and
government more than ever by generating an actual increase in the actual number of extra-
marital births.  In light of this surge, the authors do not clearly explain why church and state
failed to explore other potentially more efficient normative strategies for reducing these costs.   
Sexual restraint is not the only way to minimize out of wedlock childbearing.  Contraceptive use
and marriage rates also play a role.  If lower birth rates among more affluent girls are due as
much to more conscientious use of birth control as to fewer sexual encounters, then the critical
norms to be enforced are not just sexual restraint, but also effective and conscientious
contraceptive use.92  Likewise, a strong expectation of marriage, and of deferring reproduction to
marriage, may come into play.  Thus, the authors fail to explain why social institutions did not
step up enforcement of norms respecting contraceptive use, or in favor of marriage or
childbearing within marriage. 
E.  Other evidence, other trends  
Despite the defects in the leading theories that seek to account for growing
sociodemographic disparities, the conclusion that group differences in attitudes and thinking
have fueled demographic changes in reproduction and family structure is not likely to be a
popular one.   Likewise, the notion that groups differ systematically on these attributes and are
93  See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, Rituals of Blood; Elijah Anderson, Code of the Streets:
Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City; William Julius Wilson, supra.
94  See, e.g., Blow and Hartnett, Infidelity in Committed Relationships II: A Substantive
Review, at 224-225 (reviewing studies).  Being male, black, urban, irreligious, politically liberal,
very educated are all associated with more liberal attitudes towards infidelity.  Although there is
some evidence of a link between attitudes and infidelity, the data on the relationship and the
incidence of infidelity generally is sketchy and problematic.  See, e.g., Adrian J. Blow and Kelly
Hartnett, Infidelity in Committed Relationships I : A methodological Review, 31 J. Of Marital
and Family Therapy (April 2005) 183-216; Adrian J. Blow and Kelly Hartnett, Infidelity in
Committed Relationships II,   A Substantive Review, 31 J. Of Marital and Family Therapy
(April 2005), 217-233.  
In an effort to understand adolescent childbearing, many studies look at the sexual
practices of teenagers.  See, e.g., See also Lydia O'Donnell, Carl R. O'Donnell, Ann Stueve,
Early Sexual Initiation and Subsequent Sex-Related Risks among Urban Minority Youth: The
Reach for Health Study, Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2001), pp.
268-275;  John S. Santelli, Nancy D. Brener, Richard Lowry, Amita Bhatt and Laurie S. Zabin,
Multiple Sexual Partners Among U.S. Adolescents and Young Adults, Family Planning
Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1998), pp. 271-275  (Black and Hispanic males had
more sexual partners than whites);  John S. Santelli, R. Lowry, N.D. Brener and L. Robin The
association of sexual behaviors with socioeconomic status, family structure, and race/ethnicity
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not equally well-socialized for maintaining viable long-term relationships or for intact families is
likely to meet resistance.  As noted, social scientists studying family composition have shied
away from accounts that look to internal processes in favor of theories that identify present
economic circumstances and structural limitations.  Although cultural variations among groups
are sometimes acknowledged – as in ethnographic descriptions of the inner city underclass93 –
these patterns are largely viewed as rational adaptations to structural and economic deprivations
rather than as systematic dysfunctions in response to commonplace life challenges
  Is there additional empirical support for the analysis advanced here?  Direct evidence is
hard to come by.  Sexual practices are notoriously hard to pin down, with patterns of fidelity or
infidelity particularly elusive.  There is some support for average racial differences: research
consistently suggests that blacks initiate sexual relations earlier, have more relaxed attitudes
towards monogamy, infidelity, and extra-marital childbearing, and have greater numbers of
sexual partners.94  Correlations with education and class are less well documented.  Although
among US adolescents, American Journal of Public Health, Vol 90, Issue 10 1582-1588 (Black
adolescents and children raised in single parent families have higher rates of sexual activity.);
Freya L. Sonenstein, Joseph H. Pleck and Leighton C. Ku , Levels of Sexual Activity Among
Adolescent Males in the United States, Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Jul. -
Aug., 1991), pp. 162-167 (black male adolescents have more frequent sex, more sexual partners
and earlier initiation into sexual activity than whites or Hispanics); Robert F. Valois et al,
Relationship between number of sexual intercourse partners and selected health risk behaviors
among public high school adolescents, Journal of Adolescent Health, Volume 25, Issue 5,
November 1999, Pages 328-335(same). 
95   See, e.g., Blow and Hartnett, Infidelity in Committed Relationships II: A Substantive
Review, supra, at 224-225 (reviewing studies).
96  See William D. Mosher and James W. McNally, Contraceptive Use at First Premarital
Intercourse: United States, 1965-1988, Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May -
Jun., 1991), pp. 108-116, 108 (Noting that the proportion of women using birth control at first
premarital intercourse “varies strikingly by individual characteristics,” including race, class,
ethnicity.)  See also Paschal Sheeran, David White, and Keith Phillips, Premarital contraceptive
use: A review of the psychological literature,, Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology,
1469-672X, Volume 9, Issue 4, 1991, Pages 253 – 269; Catherine S. Chilman, Data on social
class and race differences in contraceptive use:  Social and Psychological Research concerning
Adolescent Childbearing: 1970-1980, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 42, No. 4, Decade
Review (Nov., 1980), pp. 793-805 Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Race Differences in Teenage
Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Adolescent Childbearing, in The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 65,
Supplement 2 (Part 2). Currents of Health Policy: Impacts on Black Americans (1987), pp. 381-
403.  
On pregnancy incidence, see Lawrence B. Finer and Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in
Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, Perspectives on Sexual and
Reproductive Health, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 90-96 (from 1994 to 2001, unintended
pregnancy rates were higher and growing among women with less income and education and
minorities, but lower and dropping among college graduates and wealthier women).  See also
Sex and America’s Teenagers, The Alan Guttmacher Institute (1994), at 26, 42-43 (documenting
significant race and class disparities in young women’s extra-marital pregnancy and out of
wedlock birth rates).  For educated cohorts, sympathy and support for single-motherhood does
not appear to translate into a more relaxed attitude towards extra-marital childbearing for
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well-educated persons claim to be more tolerant of sexual indiscretions and are more likely to
report committing  adultery,95 there is relatively little systematic data on class-related patterns
surrounding the formation of stable relationships that lead to marriage.   There is evidence,
however, of more unwanted pregnancies and less effective use of contraception by persons with
less education and income, as well by black and hispanic women. 96  Indeed, the data indicates
oneself.
97  For a review of work on discounting, see Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and
Ted O’Donogue, Time Discounting and Time Preference:  A Critical Review, 40 J. of Econ. Lit.
(June 2002) 351-401. 
98  See Warner and Pleeter, the Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from military
Downsizing programs, 91 American Economic Rev. (2001) 33-53, 48 (Estimating the personal
discount rates of over 65,000 individuals departing the military in the early 1990s by tracking
their choice between a lump sum severance payment or an annuity, and noting that “[h]igher test
scores may reflect better capacity to understand or process the information about intertemporal
choices.”)  See also Emily Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from
Panel Data, 99 J. Of Political Economy (1991) 54-77.  One of the first to suggest that time
horizons and propensity to defer gratification differ by social class was Edward Banfield.  See
Banfield, The Unheavenly City.
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that out of wedlock childbearing is a product both of different patterns of contraceptive use as
well as of sexual activity.  Disparities in out of wedlock childbearing rates could be driven in
large part by group differentials in effective contraception.  However, this model could also be
extended to show how different thinking styles also could influence patterns of contraceptive
use.
As noted, the tendency to think locally or globally is partly influenced by time-
preferences, or discount rate.  These may in turn correlate with socioeconomic background,
group membership, and cultural norms.  The theoretical and experimental work on discounting is
complex, and efforts to measure individual time preferences have not yielded consistent results.97 
However, a few studies based on empirical data suggest that discount rates vary by race, sex, and
education, with less educated individuals, blacks, and persons with lower cognitive capacity
having higher discount rates than whites and persons with more education.98  On the assumption
that personal discount rate can potentially influence the propensity to engage in global or local
thinking, observed group variations are consistent with currently observed sociodemographic
patterns of marital and reproductive behavior and with the predictions of this model.  Disparities
in other individual characteristics, such as personality, cognitive ability (or IQ), and executive
functioning, may bear on the propensity to adopt different styles of decisionmaking in intimate
99  There is some evidence for different personality profiles on the “big five” personality
traits by race and ethnicity.  See, e.g., David H. Autor and David Scarborough, Does Job Testing
Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(1)(February 2008) 219-277 (describing average ethnic and racial differences in personality
profiles predicting productivity and worker success, as measured on job screening tests).  On
executive control, or functioning, see, e.g., Albert Bandura,  Self-efficacy: the exercise of
control;  Peter Anderson , Assessment and Development of Executive Function (EF) During
Childhood, Child Neuropsychology, Volume 8, Issue 2 June 2002 , 71 - 82; Daniel Hackman and
Martha Farah, Socioeconomic Status and the Developing Brain, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13
(2009) 65-73.  On group differences in IQ, see e.g., Sandra Scarr, Race, Social Class, and
Individual Differences in IQ (1981). 
100  See, e.g., See, e.g., Judith Treas and Deirdre Giesen, “Sexual Infidelity among
Married and Cohabiting Americans, “ 62 J. of Marriage and the Family (Feb. 2000) 48-60; 
Adrian J. Blow and Kelly Hartnett, Infidelity in Committed Relationships I : A Methodological
Review, 31 J. of Marital and Family Therapy (April 2005) 183-216; Adrian J. Blow and Kelly
Hartnett, Infidelity in Committed Relationships II,   A Substantive Review, 31 J. of Marital and
Family Therapy (April 2005), 217-233.
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relations.99  In addition, there is a need for more detailed empirical information on actual patterns
of intimate behavior leading up to, or impeding, the formation of lasting bonds.  Although there
has been some research on attitudes and practices surrounding sexual infidelity, samples are
small and selective (in, for example, focusing on married couples rather than on sexual
exclusivity in courtship or cohabitation), the literature makes few distinctions between styles of
infidelity (whether discreet or notorious), and the data is hobbled by reliance on self-report.100 
For obvious reasons, research in this area is difficult and unreliable.  One area that deserves more
investigation is the role of different styles of infidelity in driving rates of marriage and marital
stability.  Observed patterns might reflect differences in the incidence of illicit liaisons or in how
often these liaisons become known or are allowed to disrupt the status quo.  A sociodemographic
gradient may exist in relationships that are open and notorious, as opposed to clandestine and
discreet.  But maintaining discretion also requires global thinking and the willingness to act on it. 
Persons must anticipate the possible destructive effects of their liaisons becoming known, and
exercise the restraint and self-control necessary to keep them within bounds.
101  See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis,
99 Northwestern U. Law Rev. 1463, 1467 (2004-2005) (noting a “stunning increase in consumer
bankruptcy filing rates” from 1980 to 2005, even during periods of economic growth and rising
prosperity).
102  Jeffery Sobal, Albert J. Stunkard, Socioeconomic status and obesity: A review of the
literature, Psychological Bulletin. Vol 105(2), Mar 1989, 260-275 (144 published studies of the
relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and obesity reveal an inverse relationship
between SES and overweight and attitudes to overweight);  Collen Rand, John Kuldau, The
epidemiology of obesity and self-defined weight problem in the general population: Gender,
race, age, and social class, 9 International J. Of Eating Disorders (Feb. 2006, 329-343 (finding
significant race and SES differences in overweight in a random sample of 2,115 black and white
adults, with 46% of black women, 28% of black men, 18% of white women, and 16% of white
men overweight).  See also Marc Ambinder, “Fat Nation: It’s worse than you think. How to beat
obesity”, Atlantic Monthly (May 2010) 72-83, 76 (“In fact, obesity has become a marker of sorts
for lower socioeconomic status. The lower your educational attainment, the more likely you are
to be obese . . . Black children are more at peril of become obese than white children; black
women are more than 50 percent more likely to be obese than white women.”) 
103  See, e.g., Sheila Ards and Samuel Myers, The Color of Money: Bad Credit, Wealth,
and Race, 45 American Behavioral Scientist (Oct. 2001) 223-239.
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Finally, this article’s analysis draws support from recent developments that show striking
parallels with reproductive trends.  Two notable changes in behavior during the same time period
are the rise in obesity, and the increase in overspending and overborrowing, as evidenced, for
example, by a surge in personal bankruptcy filings.101  Gradients by race and class in the
incidence of overweight are well documented, with less privileged individuals, blacks and
Hispanics more likely to exceed normal weight.102   Interpreting group differences in thrift,
savings, and spending is a more problematic exercise.  Disparities in income and wealth, the
mismatch of need and resources, and accusations of selective targeting of some groups for risky
loans and credit, confound speculation about causal mechanisms.103  Nonetheless, further
investigations on these questions may shed light on the thesis of this article and provide
additional support for its conclusions.
F.  Gender
104  See Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage: Why Married People
are Happier, Healthier, and Better off Financially; Linda Waite ed., The Ties that Bind:
Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation; see also, e.g., Audrey Light, Gender Differences in
the Marriage and Cohabitation Income Premium, 41 Demography (May 2004) 263-284 (using a
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth sample to conclude that women gain about 55% in
needs-adjusted income when they marry or cohabit, whereas men’s income levels remain mostly
unchanged.).  
105  See  Audrey Light, Gender Differences in the Marriage and Cohabitation Income
Premium, 41 Demography (May 2004) at –.
106  See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va. L. Rev. 509 (May 1998) (noting investment disparities as creating
the potential for opportunistic divorce).
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Finally, the model so far takes no systematic account of gender.  It also focuses on one
partner’s choices, and does not take fully incorporate the other partner’s response.  Interactive
effects, and differences between men and women, could well complicate the analysis.  For
example, the average value of engaging in illicit extra-curricular liaisons may be higher for men
than for women, which might make it harder for men to adopt the global view.  In addition, the
benefits to men of a long-standing committed marriage may be more remote, less tangible, and
less immediate than for women.   Although married men live longer and are healthier and
happier overall than single men, they also work harder and may not realize financial benefits
from marriage in the near term.104  Married women, in contrast, are consistently economically
better off than single women, which facilitates their short-term reproductive goals.105  On the
other hand, there is evidence that some of the marital cost-benefit mismatch works the other way,
with women making a greater investment in marital children and in-kind spousal support up
front and reaping greater rewards, in the form of lifelong financial support, later on.106  These
potential disjunctions counsel separate consideration of men’s and women’s incentives and
present co-ordination problems that are probably best modeled game-theoretically.  Adding an
interactive game-theoretic component might enrich the forgoing analysis by incorporating
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different schedules of payoffs for male and female partners from local or global options for
choice.
IV.  Conclusion
The past three decades have witnessed a growing divergence in family structure by social
class, income, education, and race.  The goal is to explain why significant segments of the
population are moving away from the traditional patterns of family and reproduction towards a
less functional mode of short term, fragile relationships.  Most demographers acknowledge that
external and material constraints fail to account for most of the present dispersion by class and
race in marriage, divorce, family structure, and out of wedlock childbearing.  Nor do these
factors explain the divergence of these patterns over time.  In attempting to improve on prior
theories, this analysis points to an altogether different explanation – one that recognizes that the
principle barriers are internal.  In tracing the lack of uniformity in family structure to distinct
modes of thinking, it recognizes that material conditions are not the pivotal source of
sociodemographic disparities, and that changes in economic circumstances will not necessarily
alter them.  In fact, the evidence points strongly to the importance of what goes on “in people’s
heads” – and the cultural factors that influence how people make decisions – rather than external
constraints.   It suggests that, in most cases, whether romantic relationships will prove durable
depends on how people think about it. 
This analysis proposes that the emergence of existing patterns is the product of two
contrasting methods of  rational decisionmaking, which differ in the temporal frame of reference
for assessing personal well-being.   A stylized model of the choice to be sexually unfaithful (or
to engage in other behaviors that impede stable monogamy) reveals that “global” thinkers will
rarely cheat on a reasonably satisfying exclusive relationship.  “Local” thinkers, in contrast, will
more often be unfaithful, thus undermining their prospects for forming or maintaining the long-
term bonds necessary for a stable family life. 
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 This analysis posits that the habits thought and action that secure successful, lasting 
intimate relationships are not uniformly distributed across society.  Observed patterns suggest
that sociodemographic groups differ in decisionmaking strategies, with lower income and
minority persons now significantly more likely to think locally and affluent persons and non-
minority group members more likely to engage in global choice.  This fragmentation along lines
of race and class can be traced to a society-wide deregulation of sexual behavior and family
formation in the wake of the 1960s sexual revolution.  Whereas strong norms of sexual conduct
had previously minimized the need for individualized calculations in this sphere, the weakening
of those conventions threw people back on unguided personal choices.   Because relatively
educated persons are better equipped to take a long view and to act on these perceptions, global
decisionmaking largely dominates among the most privileged, whereas local choice is
increasingly common in other segments of society.  This hypothesis better explains growing
disparities in family structure than existing theories that look to economic, structural, or material
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F days un‐F days Value F day Value un‐F day "Global" payoff (30 days) Average payoff per day                       
30 0 28 30 840.0 28.0
29 1 27.5 30 827.5 27.6
28 2 27 29 814.0 27.1
27 3 26.5 29 802.5 26.8
26 4 26 28 788.0 26.3
25 5 25 5 28 777 5 25 9. . .
24 6 25 27 764.4 25.5
23 7 24 27 740.6 24.7
22 8 23 26 717.9 23.9
21 9 22 26 696.3 23.2
20 10 21 26 675.7 22.5
19 11 20 25 656 3 21 9. .
18 12 19 25 637.9 21.3
17 13 18 24 620.6 20.7
16 14 16.5 24 596.4 19.9
15 15 15 23 574.3 19.1
14 16 14.5 23 568.3 18.9
13 17 13 22 549 3 18 3. .
12 18 12.5 22 544.5 18.1
11 19 11 21 528.7 17.6
10 20 10 21 520.0 17.3
9 21 9 21 512.4 17.1
8 22 8 20 505.9 16.9
7 23 7 20 500 5 16 7. .
6 24 6 19 496.1 16.5
5 25 5.5 19 495.4 16.5
4 26 5 18 488.0 16.3
3 27 4.5 17 472.5 15.8
2 28 4 16 456.0 15.2
1 29 3.5 15 438.5 14.6
Combinations of F days and un‐F days: 30‐day period
0 30 3 14 420.0 14.0
Figure 2















































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Number of Unfaithful (“un‐F”) Days Out of Last 30
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
F days un‐F days Value F day Value un‐F day "Global" payoff (30 days) Average payoff per day
Table 3 (for figure 3)
simultaneous relationship
                       
30 0 28 30 840.0 28.0
29 1 27.5 30 827.5 27.6
28 2 27 29 814.0 27.1
27 3 26.5 29 802.5 26.8
26 4 26 28 788.0 26.3
25 5 25 5 28 777 5 25 9. . .
24 6 25 27 764.4 25.5
23 7 24 27 740.6 24.7
22 8 23 26 717.9 23.9
21 9 22 26 696.3 23.2
20 10 21 26 675.7 22.5
19 11 20 25 656 3 21 9. .
18 12 19 25 637.9 21.3
17 13 18 24 620.6 20.7
16 14 16.5 24 596.4 19.9
15 15 15 23 574.3 19.1
14 16 14.5 23 568.3 18.9
13 17 13 22 549 3 18 3. .
12 18 12.5 22 544.5 18.1
11 19 11 21 528.7 17.6
10 20 10 21 520.0 17.3
9 21 9 21 512.4 17.1
8 22 8 20 505.9 16.9
7 23 7 20 500.5 16.7
6 24 6 19 496.1 16.5
5 25 5.5 19 495.4 16.5
4 26 5 18 488.0 16.3
3 27 4.5 18 499.5 16.7
2 28 4 18 512.0 17.1
1 29 3.5 18 525.5 17.5
Choice between F day and un‐F day: 30‐day period
0 30 3 18 540.0 18.0
Figure 3
















































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Number of Unfaithful (“un‐F”) Days Out of Last 30
F days un‐F days Value F day Value un‐F day "Global" payoff (30 days) Average payoff per day
Table 4 (for figure 4)
simultaneous relationship
                       
30 0 28 30 840.0 28.0
29 1 27.5 30 827.5 27.6
28 2 27 29 814.0 27.1
27 3 26.5 29 802.5 26.8
26 4 26 28 788.0 26.3
25 5 25 5 28 777 5 25 9. . .
24 6 25 27 764.4 25.5
23 7 24 27 740.6 24.7
22 8 23 26 717.9 23.9
21 9 22 26 696.3 23.2
20 10 21 26 675.7 22.5
19 11 20 25 656 3 21 9. .
18 12 19 25 637.9 21.3
17 13 18 24 620.6 20.7
16 14 16.5 24 596.4 19.9
15 15 15 23 574.3 19.1
14 16 14.5 23 568.3 18.9
13 17 13 22 549 3 18 3. .
12 18 12.5 22 544.5 18.1
11 19 11 21 528.7 17.6
10 20 10 21 520.0 17.3
9 21 9 21 512.4 17.1
8 22 8 20 505.9 16.9
7 23 7 20 500.5 16.7
6 24 6 19 496.1 16.5
5 25 5.5 19 495.4 16.5
4 26 5 18 488.0 16.3
3 27 4.5 18 499.5 16.7
2 28 4 19 540.0 18.0
1 29 3.5 20 583.5 19.5
Choice between F day and un‐F day: 30‐day period
0 30 3 21 630.0 21.0
Figure 4













































a          
30‐day period
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 300 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Number of Unfaithful (“un‐F”) Days Out of Last 30
Table 5 ‐ Partner #1
Day Value/Day – local choice Total (all days) Avg. Value/Day – global choice
1 26 26 26
2 25 51 25.5
3 24 75 25
4 25 100 25
5 26 126 25.2
6 27 153 25.5
7 28 181 25.9
8 29 210 26 3.
9 30 240 26.7
10 33 273 27.3
11 35 308 28
12 37 345 28.8
13 38 383 29.5
14 38 421 30.1








































1 26 26 26
2 25 51 25.5
3 24 75 25
4 25 100 25
5 [25] 27 127 25.4
6 26 153 25.5
7 25 178 25.4
8 25 203 25.3
9 26 229 25.4
10 27 256 25 6.
11 28 284 25.8
12 30 314 26.1
13 32 346 26.6
14 33 379 27.1
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Day Value/Day – local choice Total (all days) Avg. Value/Day – global choice
1 27 27 25.4
2 26 53 26.5
3 25 78 26
4 25 103 25.8
5 26 129 25 8.
6 27 156 26
7 28 184 26.2
8 30 214 26.8
9 32 246 27.3
10 33 279 27.9
11 34 313 28.5
12 37 350 29.2
13 39 389 29.9
14 40 429 30.6























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
   
global choice
